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ABSTRACT 
 Guided by the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and Force Design 2030, the 
Marine Corps is currently undergoing aggressive organizational change to evolve into a 
more disruptive force within the context of great power competition. An increase of 
rocket artillery batteries from seven to 21 is planned to expand deterrence capability, and 
a divestment in cannon batteries from 21 to five parallels this focus. The retention of 
cannon artillery, although reduced, can be improved to offer tactical maneuver-based 
offensive and defensive firepower to Marines across the range of military operations. 
This thesis explores which equipment and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are 
most critical for USMC cannon artillery lethality and survivability in a Russia 
counterbattery scenario. Furthermore, this study proposes potential artillery 
configurations that are resilient to uncontrollable variations of the Russian artillery force. 
Using agent-based simulation, efficient designs of experiments, and cluster computing, 
over 1.3 million artillery battles were simulated and analyzed. The findings include that 
the equipment currently fielded by USMC artillery battalions is largely in line with the 
most significant factors for lethality and survivability (caliber and range). However, 
significant changes to current TTPs, specifically increased segmentation and dispersion, 
are necessary for force protection and mission success. 
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After more than 19 years of fighting insurgencies in the global war on terrorism, 
the Marine Corps has found itself inadequately prepared to address a high-end fight against 
a peer threat. Guided by the Commandants Planning Guidance and Force Design 2030, the 
Marine Corps is currently undergoing aggressive organizational change to evolve into a 
more disruptive force within the context of great-power competition.  
With responsibilities spanning the globe and spectrum of conflict, the Marine Corps 
aims to field and equip a force capable of integrating with the U.S. Navy to deter evolving 
threats, specifically using China as the premier pacing threat. The premise assumed by the 
Marine Corps is that by designing a force using China as the pacing threat, the force can 
scale to any assigned responsibility across the range of military operations. 
The Commandants Planning Guidance and Force Design 2030 place a large 
emphasis on rocket-delivered anti-ship fires. An increase of rocket artillery batteries from 
seven to 21 is planned to expand deterrence capability, ensure access in a challenging anti-
access and area denial environment, and increase the probability of naval campaign 
success. In a fiscally constrained environment with finite resources, a planned divestment 
in cannon batteries from 21 to five parallels this focus on rocket delivered fires.  
Cannon artillery is the longest-range fires asset that is capable of offering persistent, 
all weather fire support. If cannon artillery were to be removed completely, one echelon 
lower than rocket delivered artillery is an M252 81mm mortar. The retention of cannon 
artillery, although reduced, can be improved to offer tactical maneuver-based offensive and 
defensive firepower to Marines across the contingent range of military operations that the 
Marine Corps may be called upon to address. Furthermore, by modernizing the cannon 
artillery force during a period of divestment, legacy institutional knowledge of cannon 
artillery can be retained and focused rather than atrophy. To enable force scalability, 
improvements must be made to retained cannon artillery.  
Of the two great power competitors, Russia presents the most formidable artillery 
threat. While China serves as an appropriate service pacing threat due to its economic and 
xviii 
technological base, Russia maintains the most capable and practiced fires community. 
Similar to how the Marine Corps assumes a force developed to counter the high-end 
Chinese fight will scale to lower spectrum conflict, this thesis assumes that an artillery 
force capable of countering the most sophisticated and challenging artillery threat will scale 
to threats around the globe. 
This thesis explores which equipment and tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) are most critical for USMC cannon artillery lethality and survivability in a Russia 
counterbattery scenario. Furthermore, this study proposes potential artillery configurations 
that are resilient to uncontrollable and unknown variations to the Russian artillery force. 
Using agent-based simulation, efficient designs of experiments, cluster computing, and 
data analysis, over 1.3 million artillery battles over four sets of experiments are simulated 
and analyzed across a wide range of artillery configurations.  
Experiment One: Fight Tonight serves as the base case and imagines a 
counterbattery fight occurring between USMC and Russian forces as currently equipped 
and employed. The findings are that the current USMC construct is not postured for success 
in a counterbattery engagement with Russian forces. 
Experiment Two: Train Tomorrow evaluates the efficacy of altering the most 
rapidly affectable factor of employment method. The findings are that increased 
segmentation and dispersion for Marine Corps firing units contributes significantly to both 
lethality and survivability and that training to more dispersed employment methods alone 
is sufficient for gaining a tactical advantage. In the following figure it can be seen that as 
USMC cannon artillery batteries grow more segmented and dispersed, more Russian 
casualties are produced and fewer USMC casualties are sustained, on average.  
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Effect of USMC Battery Employment Method on Blue (USMC) and Red 
(Russian) Artillery Casualties (a Casualty is Defined as a Destroyed 
Artillery Piece) 
 
Experiment Three: Optimize the Force considers all controllable USMC factors 
to determine which are most important to lethality and survivability. The conclusions from 
experiment three are that it is critical that a USMC artillery battalion employ 155mm 
weapon systems, disperse as much as possible, and employ tactics based on the operational 
capabilities of the unit. A TTP decision tree based on operational capabilities is developed 
and presented below.  
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Operational Capability Based TTP Decision Tree 
 
Experiment Four: Hedge the Construct considers controllable USMC factors and 
uncontrollable Russian factors to determine the most significant factors for USMC 
performance over a range of unknown or future Russian capabilities and tactics. Included 
in this experiment is the consideration of a Russian hybrid cannon-MLRS construct and a 
Russian cannon-pure construct. The methodology used in experiment four enables the 
analysis of robust USMC constructs that consistently perform well while remaining 
resilient across a wide range of Russian constructs. Keeping with the findings of 
experiments one and two, caliber and employment method remain critically important. A 
USMC force that prioritizes survivability should be nimble, displacing and emplacing 
quickly, and changing positions frequently; whereas a USMC force that prioritizes lethality 
should have a staying mentality, remaining in position returning defensive fire if fired upon 
and changing positions infrequently. These TTP decisions are mutually exclusive, and the 
author assumes that the commander desires to balance these priorities. The TTP decision 
tree derived in experiment three is validated in experiment four and is determined to be 
appropriate in determining TTPs predicated on the operational capabilities of the employed 
unit.  
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Ultimately, the findings of this study are that the equipment currently fielded by 
USMC artillery battalions is largely in line with the most significant factors for lethality 
and survivability, specifically 155mm caliber and sufficient range capability. However, 
significant changes to current TTPs are necessary for force protection and mission success. 
The single most critical change that the Marine Corps can influence is adopting a more 
segmented and distributed employment of cannon artillery. Beyond employment method, 
the TTPs used should be determined by operational capability. Finally, although beyond 
the scope of future USMC cannon constructs, it is found that the inclusion of an MLRS 
capability by an adversary increases casualties for both sides. Therefore, MLRS should be 
designated as a high-value target and prioritized for targeting.  
While this thesis does conclude that segmented and distributed battery operations 
are critical for cannon artillery lethality and survivability, logistics and command and 
control complexity are beyond the scope of this study. The author recommends that further 
analysis be conducted to examine the feasibility of increased dispersion in three ways. First, 
further analytic research can be conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School and 
appropriate USMC analytic branches. Second, operational units should test distributed 
battery operations in a realistic training environment to assess feasibility, human factors, 
and weaknesses. Finally, wargames should occur at the operational level to determine the 
capability gaps associated with the reduction of cannon artillery, current artillery 
constructs, and robust cannon constructs presented in this study. These three independent 
efforts are mutually supporting and can synchronize to modernize the artillery force while 
preserving fundamental capabilities.  
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A. GREAT POWER COMPETITION MODERNIZATION 
As good as we are today, we will need to be even better tomorrow to 
maintain our warfighting overmatch. We will achieve this through the 
strength of our innovation, ingenuity, and willingness to continually adapt 
to and initiate changes in the operating environment to affect the behavior 
of real-world pacing threats. 
—General David H. Berger, CMC 
(USMC 2019) 
1. USMC Modernization 
After more than 19 years of fighting insurgencies in the global war on terrorism, 
the Marine Corps has found itself inadequately prepared to address a high-end fight against 
a peer threat. The reemergence of the great power competition in the modern age requires 
structural, technological, and doctrinal changes to the Marine Corps in order to accomplish 
the charges of the National Defense Strategy. Through years of wargaming experience and 
insight, the commandant of the Marine Corps concluded that “the Marine Corps is not 
organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving 
future operating environment” and that “modest and incremental improvements to our 
existing force structure and legacy capabilities would be insufficient to overcome evolving 
threat capabilities, nor would they enable us to develop forces required to execute our 
approved naval concepts” (United States Marine Corps [USMC] 2020, p. 3).  
The 38th commandant of the Marine Corps, General David H. Berger, issued the 
Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) in July 2019 and the accompanying Force 
Design 2030 (FD30) document in 2020. The CPG is a document which charts the priorities 
for modernization of the Marine Corps, and the FD30 provides context for how this vision 
will be achieved through a redesigned force. A dominating theme of both documents is 
modernization in weapons systems, doctrine, and employment to focus on naval operations 
to counter the growing Chinese threat in the Western Pacific. Expeditionary Amphibious 
Base Operations (EABO) and stand-in forces coupled with a strategic realignment with the 
Navy are critical to the desired end state of effective deterrence and persistence and are 
2 
heavily emphasized. To accomplish this, an aggressive force redesign is being 
implemented.  
2. Enduring Responsibilities 
The great power competition outlined in the National Defense Strategy includes 
China and Russia as priority revisionist power threats. The Department of Defense has the 
concurrent objective of “[sustaining] efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes such as 
North Korea and Iran [and] defeat terrorist threats to the United States” (Department of 
Defense [DOD] 2018). 
Under United States Code Title 10, the Marine Corps is tasked with the 
responsibilities of seizing and defending advanced naval bases, conducting land operations 
essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign, and “performing all such duties as directed 
by the President” (10 U.S.C. § 8063). The Marine Corps serves as the nation’s 
Expeditionary Force in Readiness, and the Commandant has reaffirmed that the Marine 
Corps “will continue to serve as the nation’s premier crisis response force around the globe, 
and contribute to the deterrence and warfighting needs of all combatant commands” 
(USMC 2020).  
With responsibilities spanning the globe and spectrum of conflict, the CPG and 
FD30 aim to build a force with adequate capabilities to address a high-end fight. The 
premise assumed by the Marine Corps is that by designing a force using China as the 
premier pacing threat, the force can scale to any assigned responsibility across the range of 
military operations (Berger and Evans 2020).  
Mark F. Cancian, a senior advisor in the International Security Program at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, concludes that 
the lack of hedging means that the Marine Corps will not field the broad set 
of capabilities it has in the past. It will be poorly structured to fight the kind 
of campaigns that it had to fight in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. The history 
of the last 70 years has been that the United States deters great power 
conflict and fights regional and stability conflicts…The Marine Corps 
might plan to defer these conflicts to the Army, but that has not worked in 
the past. Army forces have been too small to keep the Marine Corps out of 
sustained ground combat. (Cancian 2020). 
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The challenge of designing a Marine Corps capable of addressing both the Chinese 
pacing threat and concurrent responsibilities in a fiscally constrained environment is not 
trivial. Adding to the complexity of the problem is the question of how a great-power 
conflict may emerge. At the extreme end of the spectrum is the most dangerous course of 
action—high-intensity war between the United States and a peer threat. The more likely 
course of action is a series of proxy wars and insurgencies incited by China or Russia 
(Vrolyk 2019).  
Regardless of the form of future conflict, the Marine Corps force is being designed 
to counter the most dangerous course of action. If the assumption of scalability is to hold 
true, then capabilities must be retained or developed that will foster success proportionally.  
3. Rocket and Cannon Fires 
The CPG and FD30 place a large emphasis on rocket-delivered anti-ship fires. An 
increase of rocket artillery batteries from seven to 21 is planned to expand deterrence 
capability, ensure access in a challenging anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) 
environment, and increase probability of naval campaign success. In a fiscally constrained 
environment with finite resources, a planned divestment in cannon batteries from 21 to five 
parallels this focus on rocket delivered fires (USMC 2020).  
A rocket-artillery based force optimized to create a swath of mutually contested 
space will promote access in an A2/AD environment. However, long-range anti-ship 
missiles do not scale in economy of force. A multi-million-dollar anti-ship missile is 
unlikely to be utilized against a land-based threat to personnel. If cannon artillery were to 
be removed completely, one echelon lower than rocket delivered artillery is an 81mm 
mortar. The retention of cannon artillery, although reduced, can be improved to offer 
tactical maneuver-based offensive and defensive firepower to Marines across the 
contingent range of military operations that the Marine Corps may be called upon to 
address. Furthermore, by modernizing the cannon artillery force during a period of 
divestment, legacy institutional knowledge of cannon artillery can be retained and focused 
rather than atrophy. To enable force scalability, improvements must be made to retained 
cannon artillery.  
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4. Most Capable Artillery Pacing Threat 
Of the two great power competitors, Russia presents the most formidable artillery 
threat. While China serves as an appropriate service pacing threat due to its economic and 
technological base, Russia maintains the most capable and practiced fires community. 
Similar to how the Marine Corps assumes a force developed to counter the high-end 
Chinese fight will scale to lower spectrum conflict, this thesis assumes that an artillery 
force capable of countering the most sophisticated and challenging artillery threat will scale 
to threats around the globe. Results and insights gained through analysis of the Russian 
threat can be evaluated for effective integration into the Pacific theater, enabling a cannon 
artillery force that is capable of successful operations against all potential adversaries.  
B. PURPOSE 
This study seeks to identify factors and interactions which are critical to USMC 
cannon artillery success in a Russia counterbattery scenario. Success is defined by the 
following Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs): 
• Lethality: The destruction of 50% of adversary artillery forces. 
• Survivability: Friendly artillery units remain combat capable for future 
operations following the termination of the simulation (no more than 50% 
casualties sustained). 
Both equipment and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are evaluated 
against the MOEs. The following questions are answered through simulation and analysis: 
• Which equipment factors are most critical to success in a counterbattery 
fire scenario?  
• Which TTP factors are most critical to success in a counterbattery fire 
scenario? 
• Can cannon artillery succeed by operating within enemy threat rings? 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
Using open-source weapons data and TTPs, a scenario is built using Map Aware 
Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) (McIntosh et al. 2007). An efficient design of 
experiments (DOE) is implemented to evaluate various factor levels over the design space. 
Later chapters discuss factors to be considered, levels to be evaluated, the MANA 
simulation environment and scenario, and DOE construction.  
Data are generated and collected through simulation, with insights solidified 
through analysis using the statistical analysis software JMP (SAS 2021). These insights are 
compared to current TTPs and equipment in order to offer suggestions to modernization 
efforts and inputs to future wargames.  
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II presents a literature review of the artillery process, USMC and Russian 
artillery, employment considerations, factors to be evaluated, and previous research that 
informs this study. 
Chapter III introduces the tactical scenario, conceptual model, modeling 
environment, and computer model.  
Chapter IV defines the factors to be evaluated, presents the location within the 
computer model in which each factor is affected, and establishes an incremental experiment 
methodology.  
Chapter V discusses the construction of efficient DOEs for each experiment and 
concludes with a brief discussion about the significance of efficient DOE to computational 
run time and explanatory information acquired.  
Chapter VI presents analysis on each experiment, progressively drawing insights 
into equipment and TTP factor significance, factor interactions, and TTP decisions to 
support a more capable cannon artillery force.  
Chapter VII summarizes the findings from analysis and draws final conclusions 
into the most critical factors for cannon artillery lethality and survivability in a 
counterbattery fight against a peer adversary. Recommendations for future analytic work 
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are presented, and suggestions for extending findings through USMC wargaming and 
experimentation are discussed.  
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a summary of the artillery process, a review of USMC and 
Russian artillery, a recent vignette of Russian fires employment, and definition of broad 
factors that are evaluated in this thesis, drawing insight and context from reports and 
studies.  
A. ARTILLERY BACKGROUND 
The mission of the Field Artillery is to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the 
enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fires and to help integrate all fire 
support assets into combined arms operations.  
— MCWP 3-16.4 
(USMC 2016a) 
1. The Artillery Process 
The execution of artillery operations requires three general synergistic components: 
target acquisition, weapon systems, and command and control (C2) systems. By Marine 
Corps convention, “target acquisition is detecting, identifying, and locating a target in 
sufficient detail to effectively employ munitions. The weapon systems provide the means 
to engage the target. The C2 systems provide the required facilities, equipment, 
communications, and personnel that enable the commander to plan, direct, and control 
fires” (USMC 2016a, p. 1-1). 
Historically, forward observers (FOs) have acted as the primary target acquisition 
agency. When an FO detects a target, they generate and transmit a Call for Fire (CFF). The 
CFF is transmitted to the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) for deconfliction and 
prioritization. The FSCC forwards the request for fires to an appropriate firing agency Fire 
Direction Center (FDC). The FDC calculates a ballistic firing solution, selects munitions 
and the quantity of projectiles to fire, and transmits firing data to the gunline. The gunline 
applies technical firing data and fires at the target according to instructions given by the 
FDC. Upon effects assessment, the FO either terminates the fire mission, adjusts fires, or 
calls for a repeated mission.  
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The process from target acquisition to effective munition effect is referred to as the 
kill chain. Various countries and uniform services possess different acquisition platforms, 
weapons systems, and communication architecture and technology. These various agencies 
also employ differing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). When taken in 
summation, these various aspects affect the speed of the kill chain and the method by which 
artillery is employed on the battlefield. Figure 1 provides a graphic of the generalized 
artillery kill chain. 
 
Figure 1. Simplified Artillery Kill Chain 
Technologic advancements in target acquisition, weapon systems, and command 
and control (C2) systems are quickly producing an exceedingly complex environment. No 
longer is the forward observer the only, or best, option. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
offer an extended vantage, counterbattery radars detect points of origin, and radio and 
cellular emissions reveal even dormant and concealed units. For example, on 11 July 2014, 
during the Russo-Ukrainian War Battle of Debal’tseve at Zelenopillya, Russian forces used 
both UAS and offensive cyber capabilities to identify, target, disrupt, and destroy 
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Ukrainian forces in an attack that injured more than 100 and killed 30. The attack was 
“perhaps the apogee of Russian rocket and artillery doctrine” (Fox 2017). 
2. USMC Artillery 
There has long been a desire and incentive to increase the range of cannon artillery 
systems. This is largely a hold-over capability requirement from the last 19 years of the 
Global War on Terrorism. The Marine Corps enjoyed the benefits of air superiority and 
stable fire base operations. These variables created an environment that necessitated and 
promoted increased range and accuracy. GPS-guided munitions provided increased 
accuracy and base bleed projectiles provided a range increase without significant 
modification to the intrinsic cannon range. Despite this desire for range, peer and near-peer 
adversaries can currently outrange our cannons, and their targeting cycle and tactical 
employment can overwhelm existing operating concepts (Gordon et al. 2019).  
The M777A2 lightweight 155mm towed howitzer currently fielded by the Marine 
Corps has long relative range, but emplacement and displacement times are lengthy, and 
the cannon can only be moved with the heavy Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 
(MTVR). These slower displacement times equate to an environment where unmasking 
(firing resulting in successful adversary counterbattery radar target acquisition) results in 
counterbattery fires that out-cycle current abilities to displace. Additionally, current Marine 
Corps tactics of consolidated battery sized elements leave a significant portion of available 
firepower vulnerable to a single massed strike. 
a. The Range-Speed Dilemma 
The desire for range and rapid emplacement and displacement times are at conflict. 
As seen in Figure 2, historical and current Marine Corps towed cannon systems gain range 
to the disadvantage of additional weight.  
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Adapted from Janes (2020a), (2020f), (2020g), (2020h);Wikipedia (2020a), (2020b). 
Figure 2. Range-Speed Dilemma, Towed Cannon Weight versus Range.  
The desire for further organic range (without rocket assisted projectiles) requires 
an inherently heavier cannon. Heavier towed cannons produce longer emplacement and 
displacement times. Conversely, lighter towed cannon systems that are capable of more 
rapid emplacement and displacement have less organic range.  
Technological advances have aimed to reduce weight and increase range, most seen 
in the progression from the M198 to M777A2. Although weight has been decreased 
significantly, the prime mover for the M777A2 remains the MTVR. The powerful, albeit 
heavy, MTVR is often retrofitted with armor and a troop carrier, further increasing 
dimension and weight. The M777A2/MTVR pair is a sizable couple, proving challenging 
to rapidly embark, transport, and employ. 
While helo-inserted artillery raids are technically possible, the loss of the prime 
mover renders inserted artillery incapable of movement until aircraft are able to extract. In 
a contested environment with active radar, artillery raids under the current construct are 
high risk and largely infeasible. 
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b. Transportation  
Self-propelled artillery cannons reside on a vehicle chassis or are developed as a 
whole system vehicle. The primary benefit of a self-propelled system is the ability to 
transport as a single unit, significantly decreasing emplacement and displacement time. 
Traditionally, the Marine Corps has resisted self-propelled artillery systems due to their 
inherent weight additions. Exceedingly heavy systems prove challenging for an 
expeditionary and amphibious force to employ. For example, unconstrained by 
expeditionary weight restrictions, the U.S. Army currently fields the armor protected 
155mm M109A6 Paladin. Matching the caliber and range of the M777A2, it weighs 63,352 
lbs. compared to the M777A2 at 9,100 lbs. (Jane’s 2016, 2020a).  
c. USMC Artillery Organization 
With a planned divestment in cannon batteries from 21 to five, an accurate 
assessment of the near-future organization is not possible. The Marine Corps currently 
maintains four artillery regiments (three active, one reserve). Although not accurate to 
current organizational levels, the traditional organization establishes three battalions per 
regiment. Each battalion consists of three firing batteries with six towed howitzers per 
battery. Each echelon of cannon artillery unit conventionally supports a higher echelon 
infantry unit—an artillery regiment supports a division, an artillery battalion supports an 
infantry regiment, and an artillery battery supports an infantry battalion.  
3. Russian Artillery 
While the U.S. commonly refers to artillery as the “King of Battle,” the Russian 
military emphatically declares artillery to be the “God of War.” Russia utilizes long range 
indirect fires as its main effort, hinging its bid for success on rapid and integrated target 
acquisition methodologies. The Russian concept of operations “consists of the capability 
to deliver devastating indirect fires, while maintaining stand off from their enemy, and 
protecting their own forces through the use of ADA (air defense artillery) and Electronic 
Warfare (EW). Once adequate fires have been delivered, ground forces begin to maneuver, 
preferably with an armored element to secure time and space for indirect fire and protection 
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platforms to move forward and begin the cycle again” (United States Army [USA] 2016, 
p. 12).  
To emphasize the significance that the adversary places on artillery, a Fort 
Leavenworth based Foreign Military Studies Office report concluded its study of Russian 
artillery fires with the following:  
Precision fires have their place and quick destruction of high-threat targets 
is optimum for survival, but the Russians have not abandoned their use of 
massed artillery. Massed artillery not only destroys—it produces paralysis 
and psychic terror. ‘The experience of modern wars and armed conflicts 
shows that artillery is still the god of war. Airstrikes cannot replace massed 
artillery fire. And the most effective way to protect your troops from enemy 
artillery is to destroy that artillery with counterbattery fire, when enemy 
artillery positions are detected and instantly suppressed.’ So, the Russians 
plan to improve their reconnaissance-fire system while retaining their 
ability to dominate the battlefield through massed artillery fire. (Grau and 
Bartles 2018) 
With a preference for mass and standoff, Russia continues to prioritize its artillery 
modernization efforts. Russia prefers to refurbish and modify existing systems, 
establishing an economic baseline of proven systems that are rapidly producible and 
modularly repairable (Grau and Bartles 2016).  
a. Transportation 
While Russia maintains towed artillery, the preferred broad weapon system of 
choice is the heavy self-propelled howitzer and self-propelled Multiple Launch Rocket 
System (MLRS). This preference supports the practiced concept of maneuver by fire. 
Russia is currently field testing the new 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV 152mm self-propelled 
howitzer which is projected to enter service in 2021. With a rocket-assisted range of 70km 
and an automatic loading firing rate of 16 rounds per minute, the 2S35 doubles the range 
of the M777A2 and triples the rate of fire (Janes 2020b). This newly developed technology 
is a testament to the priority of artillery modernization given Russia’s historical preference 
to invest in quantity by refurbishing existing systems.  
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b. Russian Artillery Organization 
Russian forces operate in brigades. Each brigade consists of one MLRS battalion 
and two self-propelled artillery battalions. The MLRS Battalion consists of three batteries, 
each with six BM-21 “Grad” 122mm launchers (18 total). Each self-propelled howitzer 
battalion consists of three batteries, each with six 2S19 Msta-S 152mm self-propelled 
howitzers (18 guns/battalion, 36 guns/brigade). Figure 3 shows the traditional organization 
of these MLRS and cannon battalions.  
 
Adapted from The Russian Way of War (Grau and Bartles 2016, p. 234–236). 
Figure 3. Russian MLRS and Self-Propelled Howitzer Battalion 
Organization.  
The Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) forms the basis of the Russian combined arms 
force. Comprised of brigade forces, the flexible BTG is task-organized for a specific 
mission set. Inherent in every configurable BTG is a heavy contingent of artillery.  
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B. A RUSSIAN KILL-CHAIN VIGNETTE 
Under the cover of darkness on the morning of 11 July 2014, a large Ukrainian 
force of mechanized vehicles assembled to prepare for an early morning offensive against 
Russian forces near Zelenopillya along the Ukrainian-Russian border. At 0430 as final 
preparations were being made, all radio communications were lost and multiple drones 
were heard overhead. Just minutes later, an intense Russian artillery barrage killed 30 
Ukrainian soldiers and destroyed two mechanized battalion’s worth of equipment (Fox 
2017). 
This recent example of the Russian kill-chain at work provides context to the 
challenge presented by the Russian threat. In the Zelenopillya attack, Russian forces used 
cyber capabilities to identify approximate Ukrainian force positions, UAV capabilities to 
refine target locations, EW capabilities to disrupt communications, and mass fires to 
destroy a large swath of territory (Fox 2017). The first warning that Ukrainian forces had 
of an impending strike was the audible noise of Orlan-10 reconnaissance drones and 
simultaneous loss of communications, and within minutes hundreds of missiles and 
artillery projectiles were impacting positions.  
Zelenopillya was unique in the fact that Russia unveiled its Reconnaissance-Fire 
system in depth. The Russian Reconnaissance-Fire system is an integrated system of 
reconnaissance drones, cyber capabilities, Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), and 
long-range mass strike capability that produces a highly efficient kill-chain with 
devastating effects (Grau and Bartles 2018). Additionally, the attack reinforced the 
historical Russian doctrine of utilizing its fires capabilities as its primary destructive force 
“reflecting the bromide that ‘artillery conquers, infantry occupies’” (Fox and Rossow 
2017). 
While Russia does have formidable precision strike capability, it continues to prefer 
mass over precision. One paper that examined the Reconnaissance-Fire system concludes 
that “Russian artillery units will expend far more conventional rounds than expensive, 
high-precision rounds” (Grau and Bartles 2018). This analysis also found that “the primary 
method of executing reconnaissance-fire missions will be to engage newly-discovered 
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enemy targets with brief fire assaults and subsequent changes of position to avoid 
retaliatory fire” (Grau and Bartles 2018). 
Insight gained into the Russian kill-chain from the Zelenopillya attack coupled with 
the knowledge that Russian units prefer to mass fires and make evasive survivability moves 
lends perspective to what the Marine Corps may have to contend with.  
C. FACTORS 
In this section, the author introduces seven broad equipment and TTP based factor 
families that are influential in cannon artillery performance.  
1. Employment 
Marine cannon artillery is conventionally employed in consolidated battery-sized 
elements. In consolidated battery operations, six-gun batteries are employed as the smallest 
tactical unit. The benefits of operating in this manner are a more robust local security, 
central battery C2, key billet holder centralization, and battalion level operational control. 
Disadvantages include physical proximity of firing pieces, higher levels of 
communications emissions, and large proportion of assets incapable of fire when not fire 
capable (FIRECAP). Higher levels of communication’s emissions increase probability of 
detection, physical proximity renders units vulnerable to mass strike, and the decision to 
displace the battery removes availability of a significant amount of assets from the 
battlefield for a period of time. 
Split battery operations are considered based on the tactical situation. In split 
battery employment, the traditional six-gun battery disperses into two, three-gun platoons 
with organic platoon FDCs. These platoons operate geographically separated from each 
other. This increases C2 complexity and decreases local security capability, but units are 
hedged against single mass strike annihilation and can displace sequentially, maintaining 
FIRECAP as the sister unit is moving.  
Distributed operations consist of individual or pairs of cannons operating 
geographically separated from the other guns of the battery. All battery guns are controlled 
by the battery FDC, also geographically separated. Distributed operations represent the 
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most complex C2 of all employment methods, but the geographic separation of all pieces 
offers the highest survivability among employment options. Local security is extremely 
lacking in distributed operations, with individual pieces possessing few assets with which 
to organically defend itself. A recent study which examined employment options found 
that simulated distributed operations resulted in a 70% higher probability of victory 
compared to consolidated battery operations (Turk 2020).  
2. Time in Position 
Time in position refers to the time spent occupied in a position after firing. 
Increasingly capable artillery reconnaissance systems present a dilemma between the 
decision to displace upon firing to increase survivability against the desire to remain 
FIRECAP. Prior to unmasking by firing, a unit can be located by a forward observer, UAV, 
or EW. Every round fired from a position has a possibility of being detected by 
counterbattery radar. Regardless of how a unit is targeted, once the adversary kill chain is 
initiated, rounds could impact the position within a short period of time.  
Remaining in a position keeps that unit FIRECAP and responsive. The size of the 
unit firing also factors into the adversary decision to counterfire. If the unit is small, a mass 
strike may not be advisable from a risk perspective. By unmasking their own fire units in 
a counterbattery strike, the adversary opens itself up to counterbattery fire from previously 
undetected units.  
While it may seem intuitive that the best way to ensure survivability is to fire and 
immediately displace, this course of action results in a decrease in FIRECAP units, and 
this may significantly affect the battlefield. Additionally, immediate displacement only 
increases survivability if the unit is able to clear the area before counterbattery rounds 
impact. One study found that frequent movement reduces risk at the expense of reduced 
lethality, and recommends remaining occupied after firing in order to produce lethal effects 
(Shim 2017). This finding was validated and amplified by Capt Turk, who found that Time 
in Position was a dominant factor for survivability and that in the cases he examined there 
was an “increase in survivability when the battery chose to stay in the position and increase 
the rate of fire” (Turk 2020).  
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3. Rate of Fire 
Measured in rounds per minute, rate of fire is affected by method of load and 
physical gun limitations. Undergoing enormous pressure and heat exchanges, cannon tubes 
can maintain a rapid rate of fire for a limited amount of time, and a sustained rate of fire 
thereafter.  
The current M777 is a crew loaded howitzer, requiring a load and ram team. To the 
expense of weight, some artillery systems possess automatic loading systems, reducing 
crew requirements and permitting a higher rate of fire (Gordon et al. 2015).  
4. Camouflage and Concealment 
By utilizing natural concealment such as foliage as well as position improving 
concealment techniques, Marine artillery decreases its chances of visual detection. 
Although visual and radar scattering nets reside in the inventory, placing them over an 
M777A2 and all battery vehicles is a significant task that slows displacement times 
dramatically. Effective concealment is not currently widely practiced as the requirement 
for concealment was not a priority in recent conflicts. A recent RAND report that evaluated 
U.S. Army artillery requirements for high-end conventional war concludes that “against a 
powerful opponent such as Russia, cover, concealment, and deception will be essential” 
(Gordon et al. 2019, p. 182).  
With an ability to project reconnaissance unencumbered by terrain, Russia utilizes 
its UAVs to “significantly [supplement] forward observation capabilities, a very important 
technological development for an artillery-centric post-Soviet army” (Grau and Bartles 
2018). Russian use of UAVs as a primary target acquisition method is expected to grow 
even stronger as Russia develops its Reconnaissance-Fire Complex system (Grau and 
Bartles 2018).  
5. Emplacement and Displacement 
Emplacement consists of all actions required from the occupation of a position to 
the capability to fire. Conversely, displacement consists of all actions from being 
FIRECAP to movement out of a position. The desire for rapid emplacements and 
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displacements are twofold: to decrease time when fires are not available and to increase 
survivability.  
A unit is unable to provide responsive fires when it is displacing, transiting, and 
emplacing. By shortening the time required to emplace and displace, a unit is able to 
establish itself as a more persistent asset. If a unit is able to displace faster than the 
adversary kill chain can produce effects on its position, then survivability is increased.  
One study that conducted an analysis of alternative artillery systems for the Marine 
Corps concluded that “until the M777 is replaced with an independently mobile artillery 
system, training and readiness standards should place a greater emphasis on decreasing 
emplacement and displacement times, as well as increased use of survivability moves” 
(Browne 2018).  
6. Range 
Ideally, a unit possesses organic range greater to that of its adversary, remaining 
outside of its threat ring while able to produce effects. As discussed in Chapter 1, an 
increase in range requires an increase in weight. For a highly mobile expeditionary force 
with unique transportability requirements, weight is a significant constraint. If unable to 
achieve range greater than the adversary, TTPs should support survivability and lethality 
within the range of adversary effects.  
Recent joint efforts such as the Long Range Cannon project aim to increase the 
range of current USMC cannon artillery systems. These efforts include both technological 
advancements to the M777 as well as improved base bleed, rocket-assisted projectiles 
(Gaitan-Tovar and Bound 2019). One attractive series of modifications doubles current 
range. However, this benefit to this range increase is at the expense of an additional 1,000 
pounds, six additional feet of cannon tube, and expensive GPS guided projectiles (Military 
News 2018). 
This thesis evaluates range as a primary factor to determine whether increased 
range is a dominant contributor to success or if Marine artillery units can succeed with 
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reduced range capabilities in exchange for more robust capabilities in areas such as 
emplacement and displacement speed.  
7. Caliber 
Although different effects are generated by different projectile types, the kinetic 
strength of the projectile is generally determined by the caliber of the weapon system. A 
155mm cannon fires a larger and more powerful round than that of a 105mm cannon. The 
caliber of the weapons system has implicit constraining effects on the weight and range of 
the weapons system. The size and relative power of both the 105mm and 155mm projectile 
is evaluated in this study.  
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III.  MODELING 
The purpose of the simulation model is to determine which elements of tactics and 
equipment are most important for survivability and lethality in an air-denied, 
counterbattery scenario. In this chapter, the researcher develops a theoretical scenario for 
a post force closure artillery engagement, illustrates the conceptual intent of the model, 
introduces the chosen modeling environment, and describes the computer simulation.  
A. SITUATION 
The following scenario is adapted from RAND RR2124: Army Fires Capabilities 
for 2025 and Beyond. The researcher emphasizes that the scenario is purely theoretical and 
is intended for analysis purposes only.  
1. Strategic 
Bolstered by strategic success in Ukraine and favorable testing of international 
response, Red maintained increasing confidence that a swift incursion into neighboring 
territory would increase its sphere of influence. Seeking a strategic defeat on NATO, Red 
developed operational plans to attack, occupy, and isolate the Baltic states of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania.  
 
Figure 4. Baltic States. Adapted from Gordon et al. (2019). 
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Due to geographical proximity, Red assumed that it could deny NATO flexibility 
of action through superior operational tempo and rapid seizure of key terrain. Intending to 
leverage A2AD and sensor-strike capabilities, Red maneuvered forces within their 
geographically owned territory to deny deep counterstrike and force a frontal response.  
 
Figure 5. Red A2AD and Sensor-Strike Plan. Source: Gordon et al. (2019). 
2. Operational 
After gaining access to the Baltic Sea, a Blue Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) 
conducted an amphibious landing along the western coast of Latvia. Among the assault 
forces were one cannon artillery battalion. The mission of the Blue cannon artillery 
battalion is to support the seizure of an improved expeditionary airfield in the vicinity of 
Riga, Latvia in order to enable follow on MEB force deployment and flexibility of action 
for the MEB Aviation Combat Element (ACE).  
Anticipating the operational value of the expeditionary airfield, Red deployed fires 
elements of a Brigade Tactical Group (BTG) to establish defensive fires positions. One 
battalion consisting of two 2S19M2 self-propelled howitzer batteries and one BM21 ‘Grad’ 
MLRS battery comprise the defensive fires elements.  
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Figure 6. Operational Maneuver of Red and Blue Fires Elements 
3. Tactical 
Red has taken up defensive positions in unknown locations approximately 6–10 
kilometers to the east of the objective area. Airspace remains contested and neither Red 
nor Blue expect close air support. Terrain is rural and consists of open fields and lightly 
forested, gently rolling hills. High speed roads border the airfield with unimproved roads 
interspersed throughout the area of operations, and vehicular traffic is relatively unimpeded 
when off of roads.  
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Figure 7. Approximate Red and Blue Battery Locations, Tactical Level 
B. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The model intends to explore the interactions between artillery units in a 
counterbattery scenario. All units unnecessary to this aim are eliminated from 
consideration. Both Red and Blue have firing units and target acquisition elements unique 
to their respective force structure and order of battle.  
With an air contested environment, artillery is the highest level of fire support 
available to Red and Blue. Red leverages artillery as its main effort and intends to prevent 
Blue’s advance to seize the airfield. Having assumed defensive positions, Red will 
prioritize striking Blue’s fires assets in order to gain fire superiority. Conversely, Blue 
prioritizes the seizure of the objective area and will balance forward movement with 
adequate FIRECAP units in order to respond proactively to Red units acquired or 
retroactively to fires received by Red.  
As Blue approaches the objective area, both Red and Blue attempt to acquire 
opposing fires assets through UAS. When a target is acquired, a fire mission is generated 
to attack the target. Counterbattery radar is active on the battlefield, and any missions 
executed will unmask the firing element, rendering them vulnerable to radar detection. If 
an unmasked unit is detected by opposing radar, a call for fire is generated and transmitted 
to available fires elements for engagement. If rounds impact a position, the unit under 
attack will briefly attempt to gain fire superiority through an increased rate of fire and 
subsequently conduct an emergency displacement.  
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Red will remain in defensive positions as long as no incoming fires are received. 
Red will conduct emergency displacements to prepared alternate positions if fires are 
received. Blue will conduct survivability moves toward the objective area if no fire 
missions are received after a set amount of time. Blue will conduct emergency 
displacements toward the objective area if fires are received.  
C. COMPUTER SIMULATION 
This section introduces the modeling environment used in this study and discusses 
the modeling logic used to create the simulation. 
1. Introduction to MANA 
The modeling environment selected for this thesis is Map Aware Non-Uniform 
Automata (MANA), developed by New Zealand’s Defense Technology Agency in 2000. 
MANA is a stochastic, agent-based, time-stepped, mission-level modeling environment 
that excels at tactical level simulation under certain conditions (Lucas 2020).  
While high resolution, physics-based models provide high fidelity analysis of 
certain aspects of weapons systems performance, they generally lack the ability to integrate 
dynamic personality-driven decisions, situation awareness, and inter-unit communications. 
MANA was developed to specifically address these deficiencies (McIntosh et al. 2007).  
MANA is an accessible modeling environment with a shallow learning curve. A 
simple graphical user interface (GUI) enables the modeler to construct a mission-level 
scenario using an intuitive and logical approach. The modeler is able to watch the 
simulation run with geographical movement and interactions visually displayed.  
The stochastic nature of MANA allows for variance in simulation runs based on a 
pseudorandom seed. Seed values are captured throughout simulation runs, enabling the 
modeler to identify and play back anomalous outlier outputs, assisting in unique situation 
and error detection. 
Significantly, MANA is easily data farmable. The modeler is able to develop a 
design of experiments (DOE) of various factors and levels to run the simulation under 
differing conditions. The ease of DOE integration and modeler control of output statistics 
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allows the modeler to quickly generate insights into factor importance in pursuit of an 
objective.  
2. Agent Interaction and Personalities 
In MANA, military units are represented by agents. Agents are organized into 
groups called squads. Each squad is built to model certain capabilities and assume a certain 
personality, dictating the manner in which the agents of the squad interact with the terrain 
and friendly, neutral, and enemy agents. As a squad of agents progresses through the 
simulation, it can assume various states, triggered by events. Each state is built to have its 
own personality, which dictates the action and priorities of the squad at that point in time. 
Figure 8 shows an example of the various personality traits that can be defined for a squad.  
 
Figure 8. MANA Personality and State GUI 
In the above case, USMC_Battery_1 is a squad of six howitzer agents. This squad 
is built to have a high preponderance to reach the next waypoint when it is in the Spare 1 
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state. This means that the squad (and agents comprising the squad) will prioritize reaching 
the next waypoint above other actions.  
The manner in which a squad progresses through states—and the personalities of 
those states—dictate how the squad interacts with all aspects of the simulation. By defining 
many squads, establishing communication links, placing them in appropriate initial 
locations, establishing waypoints, and imbuing the squads with personalities based on 
states, a simulation can be built to approximate a tactical, mission-level engagement within 
the constraints of MANA.  
 
3. Battlespace, Terrain, and Movement 
The tactical scenario terrain and geometry of Riga, Latvia are similar to that of Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina. The computer model presented in this thesis uses Fort Bragg as the 
area of operations due to availability of MGRS mapping and possible reader familiarization 
with the area. The simulation area of operations is 34 kilometers by 20 kilometers in size, 
and each model time step is one second.  
 
Figure 9. Model Background, Fort Bragg, NC 
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MANA uses a hidden terrain layer which effects agent movement. The modeler 
defines three key metrics for each color. The terrain layer for this simulation is shown in 
Figure 10. Depending on which terrain type (color) an agent is on, its speed (going), cover, 
and concealment are affected as a percentage of its attributes. For example, yellow depicts 
high speed roads surrounding the objective area. An agent on a yellow pixel is able to move 
at full speed, but has no cover or concealment. Similarly, an agent on a dark green (dense 
bush) pixel can only move at 20% of its attributed speed, but is 30% protected by cover 
and has 90% concealment. Agents will self-select the best terrain to move on depending 
on its personality. If an agent is built to have a high preponderance to reach its next 
waypoint, it will choose the path that allows it to reach the waypoint in the shortest time 
possible. The agent may elect to travel along a high-speed road, or it may choose a direct 
path through slower going terrain if the slower path allows for a more optimal arrival time.  
 
Figure 10. Terrain Effects on Going, Cover, and Concealment 
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4. Acquisition Agents 
The methods of target acquisition available to Blue and Red are UAS and 
counterbattery radar. UAS and counterbattery radar operate independently, but have 
complementary effects. Neither can be targeted nor destroyed by opposing action. This 
section details the modeling logic of each acquisition method, how the agent is involved in 
the total schema, and workarounds implemented by the modeler to best approximate 
realistic employment.  
In MANA, sensors are established to detect and classify. Detection is the simple 
case of any agent being sensed by the sensor. Classification is the proper identification of 
agent loyalty and class of the agent.  
The class of firing agents (howitzers or MLRS) is determined by the state that the 
gun is in. Acquisition agents classify an opposing firing asset based on the firing assets’ 
class. Firing agents change between three distinct classes (Class 1 is reserved for non-firing 
agents): 
• Class 2: Undetectable (Displacing, Moving, Emplacing) 
• Class 3: FIRECAP, have not fired (Masked) 
• Class 4: FIRECAP, have recently fired (Unmasked) 
Both Red and Blue have one UAS, and each shares a similar North-South zig-zag 
search pattern over the area of unknown emplacement, as seen in Figure 11. The UAS is 
built with a personality to loiter near detected unknown and enemy agents. The loitering 
pattern gives the UAS sensor more opportunities to correctly classify the agent. The UAS 
is capable of detecting firing agents of Class 3 and Class 4 (any FIRECAP unit, regardless 
of recent firing status). If an opposing firing agent is detected and subsequently classified 
by the UAS, the UAS will transmit the positive identification location to all FDCs with a 
30 second latency. At some point during the loitering pattern, the agent will make a 
personality-based decision to continue its prescribed search pattern.  
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Figure 11. UAS Search Patterns 
Due to similarities between the conventional UAS systems, both Red and Blue 
UASs are modeled after the RQ-21A Blackjack and range classification probabilities were 
derived from an Operational Test and Evaluation report, discussed in Appendix A.  
Counterbattery radar operates by identifying projectile flight trajectories and 
extrapolating to determine the point of origin. Red and Blue counterbattery radar is only 
able to detect and classify firing agents of Class 4, the state in which a firing agent has 
recently fired a round. Upon successful classification, the counterbattery radar transmits 
the point of origin location to its respective battery FDC with a 30 second latency.  
Conventionally, an artillery battalion is supported by a single counterbattery radar. 
At the battalion headquarters level, counterfire is deconflicted across batteries to ensure 
that all are not unmasked at once. MANA does not possess adequate functionality to 
facilitate deconfliction. The modeler coerced deconfliction by instantiating three 
counterbattery radars with degraded capabilities and assigned one counterbattery radar to 
each battery. The instantiation time for each counterbattery radar was staggered at the 
beginning of the simulation run. By increasing the average time between detection and 
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decreasing the probability of classification, the cumulative functionality of the modeled 
radar agents is approximately equal to that of one fully functional counterbattery radar in 
support of a battalion. By staggering instantiation time, relative deconfliction of firing is 
achieved as each battery will fire only on agents classified by their paired counterbattery 
radar.  
Each battery FDC passively waits for target locations to be transmitted by UAS or 
counterbattery radar. Upon receipt of a target location, the FDC transmits the location to 
the firing agents under its control with a latency of 60 seconds. This latency was derived 
from current Training and Readiness standards as the time for data computation standards. 
Figure 12 depicts the simulation state diagrams and communication flows for the UAS, 
counterbattery radar, and FDC.  
 
Figure 12. UAS, Counterbattery Radar, and FDC Simulation-State Diagrams 
5. Fires Agents 
Although Red and Blue fires platforms differ in capability, each follows a common 
logical pattern. The following sections document the closed-loop state transitions for Blue 
and Red firing agents.  
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a. Blue Firing Agents 
The simulation-state diagram for the Blue firing agent squads is shown in Figure 
13. For readability, firing agent squads will hereby be referred to as guns. The discussion 
that follows describes each state, transition, and analogous real-world event.  
 
Figure 13. Blue Firing Agent Squad Simulation-State Diagram 
At the beginning of the model run, Blue guns begin in the Spare 3 state. This state 
simulates the guns being emplaced, FIRECAP, and awaiting fire missions. In Spare 3, the 
guns are Class 3 (only detectable by UAS) and possess some level of concealment. From 
Spare 3, three key events can happen.  
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First, if the guns receive a fire mission, they will execute the mission by 
transitioning to the Squad Taken Shot state. The guns will become susceptible to 
counterbattery radar (Class 4). If no counterbattery fires are received, the guns will 
transition back to Spare 3 after 20 seconds, which is approximately the time of flight for a 
projectile at the ranges under evaluation.  
Second, if at any point the guns receive incoming fires, they will immediately 
transition into the Squad Shot At state. The rate of fire will be increased in an effort to gain 
fires superiority. After a set amount of time, the guns will conduct transition into Spare 2 
state in order to displace.  
Finally, if the guns receive no fire mission or incoming fire within a certain amount 
of time in Spare 3, then a survivability move is conducted by transitioning into the 
displacement Spare 2 state.  
Regardless of how the guns reached the transition to the displacement Spare 2 state, 
they will eventually begin to displace. After a certain amount of time displacing, guns will 
transition into Spare 1, or the movement state. At this time, the guns become 100% 
concealed and are reduced to Class 2, meaning that they are undetectable to any acquisition 
effort. In this state, the guns are moving to their next position with a high preponderance 
to reach the next waypoint. Upon reaching the next position, the guns transition into the 
Reach Waypoint state, which begins the emplacement.  
While emplacing, the guns are Class 2 and not detectable by any acquisition effort. 
Due to the air-denied environment and the high value of fires assets to the tactical situation, 
the modeler assumes that a fire mission will be conducted only after a targeted unit is fully 
emplaced. Realistically, the earlier a unit receives fires in its emplacement phase, the faster 
it can displace out of incoming fire. Conversely, if a unit is permitted to become fully 
emplaced prior to being fired upon, it is significantly more difficult to displace quickly. 
Given the risk incurred by unmasking by firing, it is advantageous to wait for a unit to 
become fully emplaced before an attack. It is for this reason that guns remain Class 2 during 
emplacements.  
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Once the emplacement is complete, the guns transition back to Spare 3, and are 
FIRECAP and awaiting fire missions. For each independent fire agent squad, this closed-
loop process repeats itself for the duration of the simulation.  
In a counterbattery scenario with targets often acquired by counterbattery radar, it 
is important to note that missions are conducted against a point of origin rather than a 
visually detected and tracked target. MANA assumes that once detected, a targeted agent 
can be fired upon with fires automatically adjusted for position. This behavior is counter 
to the intended point of origin mission with minimal battle damage assessment. To coerce 
intended point of origin attack, the guns were built to receive fire mission location data as 
a snapshot-in-time location, which is displayed on an inorganic contact persistence map. 
The targets remain on this inorganic contact persistence map for five minutes. This forces 
the guns to fire upon the point-of-origin without tracking the target if it were to move during 
the conduct of the mission.  
By this logic, a fire mission will be conducted if the guns are in a FIRECAP state 
and are not processing another mission. If the guns are not in a FIRECAP state, the mission 
will not be conducted, with one exception. If the guns receive a fire mission when they are 
not in a FIRECAP state but manage to transition into a FIRECAP state while the target 
resides on the inorganic contact persistence map, then the mission will be conducted.  
b. Red Firing Agents 
The majority of the logic presented for the Blue firing agent squads holds true for 
Red. The differences in logical state changes are due to the defensive posture of Red and the 
two different weapons systems employed by Red. The simulation state diagrams for Red 
cannon firing agent squads and Red MLRS firing agent squads are shown in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14. Red Cannon and MLRS Firing Agent Squads Simulation-State 
Diagrams 
Regardless of weapon type, Red firing agents begin in the Default state, analogous 
to the Spare 3 state of Blue. Unlike Blue, Red does not maintain a direct transition arc from 
the Default (FIRECAP) state to the Spare 2 (displacement) state. This is because Red, in 
defensive positions, does not conduct survivability moves if no events occur after a certain 
amount of time. Except for this alteration, the Red cannons maintain a logical state change 
identical to the Blue firing agents.  
Red MLRS do not have arcs from Squad Taken Shot to the Default or Squad Shot 
At states. This is due to the conventional employment of MLRS. Since the MLRS system 
expends a full pod of rockets in a single fire mission, the squad transitions into the Spare 2 
(displacement) state at the conclusion of firing. A transition arc to Squad Shot At is 
unnecessary since all rocket ammunition is already expended after conducting a fire 
mission and the unit desires a rapid displacement before refitting. Lacking the capability 
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for subsequent attacks before a lengthy pod reload time, this transition is realistically 
necessary as a survivability move. If the squad enters the Squad Shot At state, it 
immediately transitions to the Spare 2 state. No increased rate of fire will occur due to the 
firing mechanics of pod-stored rocket fires.  
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IV. FACTORS AND EXPERIMENT METHODOLOGY 
To identify the factors most important to Blue lethality and survivability, multiple 
experiments are conducted, each of which provides unique insights. This chapter discusses 
the location of each factor within the computer model and presents our experiment 
methodology.  
A. FACTORS AND LEVELS EVALUATED 
To answer the question of which factors most significantly influence lethality and 
survivability of cannon artillery in a Russian counterbattery scenario, Chapter II 
established seven broad factor categories to be evaluated in this thesis. These are 
• Employment Method 
• Time in Position 
• Rate of Fire 
• Camouflage and Concealment 
• Emplacement and Displacement 
• Range 
• Caliber 
These broad factors can generally be split into equipment and TTP based categories, 
as seen in Figure 15. Equipment based factors are those which are most influenced by the 
weapon systems employed on the battlefield. TTP based factors are those which are most 
influenced by unit standard operating procedure or decisions made by the commander. 




Figure 15. Broad Factor Families 
Within the computer model, each broad factor is influenced by various inputs to the 
firing agent squad. The broad factors are segmented into more granular factors, each 
affecting a specific aspect of the firing agent. Using the previously presented simulation 
state diagram for the firing agent squads, each factor’s data input location is identified.  
B. EQUIPMENT BASED FACTORS 
The five broad equipment-based factors established are rate of fire, range, caliber, 
emplacement time, and displacement time. Figure 16 shows the specific location of each 
of the aspects of these broad factors.  
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Figure 16. Equipment-Based Factor Simulation State Diagram Locations 
Rate of fire is changed in each of the FIRECAP states. Offensive rate of fire, or the 
rate at which the weapons system fires projectiles during an offensive fire mission, is 
affected in the Spare 3 and Squad Taken Shot state. Defensive rate of fire, or the increased 
rate of fire at which the weapon system fires after receiving incoming projectiles, is 
affected in the Squad Shot At state.  
Both Range and Caliber are varied in the FIRECAP states of Spare 3, Squad Taken 
Shot, and Squad Shot At states. Emplacement time is the time to transition from Reach 
Waypoint to Spare 3, and displacement time is the time to transition from Spare 2 to Spare 
1.  
C. TTP BASED FACTORS 
The three broad TTP-based factors established are time in position, camouflage, 
and employment method. Figure 17 shows the specific location of each of the aspects of 




Figure 17. TTP-Based Factor Simulation State Diagram Locations 
Time in position is affected in two distinct locations. First, the time until a 
survivability move is conducted occurs in the transition time between Spare 3 and Spare 2. 
This is the amount of time that a unit will remain FIRECAP before displacing if no actions 
occur. Second, the amount of time a unit remains in position after receiving incoming fires 
is identified as the transition time between Squad Shot At and Spare 2. If this is set to be 
zero seconds, a unit displaces immediately after receiving incoming fires. If this is set to 
five minutes, then the unit exchanges rounds with an increased rate of fire until beginning 
displacement after five minutes.  
Camouflage, or the amount of concealment a unit has from UAS detection, is 
affected in Spare 3, the only state in which a unit is FIRECAP and masked.  
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The only factor that cannot be controlled by varying a data input to the simulation 
is employment method. MANA lacks the ability to dynamically distribute a unit while 
maintaining adequate control measures. In order to control the employment method factor 
by tactic, four separate scenarios were implemented in MANA.  
As discussed in Chapter II, USMC artillery conventionally operates as 
consolidated, six-gun batteries where a battery FDC controls six geographically centralized 
howitzers. In split battery operations, one FDC controls two three-gun sections which are 
geographically separated. In distributed operations, one FDC controls six geographically 
separated howitzers. These three employment methods are currently practiced to differing 
extents. The modeler created one theoretical section employment method in which one 
FDC controls three two-gun sections which are geographically separated. Figure 18 
provides a visual reference of these employment method constructs.  
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Figure 18. Employment Method Constructs 
Regardless of employment method, Blue firing units progress toward the objective 
area. In order to deconflict movement, each firing squad is assigned a proportional lane to 
maneuver toward the objective area. As units become more dispersed, each respective 
firing squad lane becomes narrower. Each battery maintains an approximately equal lane 
width throughout each employment method, with the size of each firing section size 
dictating the lane width of the respective firing squad. Figure 19 provides a graphical 
representation of the force laydown throughout each of the four employment methods.  
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Figure 19. Employment Method Force Laydown and Movement 
In order to vary the employment method factor across these four levels, four 
simulation scenarios were created. In each, the only difference is the number of blue firing 
squads, the number of agents comprising each squad, and the initial location and waypoints 
of each squad.  
D. FACTORS UNIQUE TO RED 
Red factors are not altered until the fourth experiment. All factors that are varied 
for Red are identified above with the exception of armor and conventional force 
composition. 
The modeler assumes that armor integration will not be pursued for Blue given 
USMC expeditionary weight constraints. Red is under no such constraints and actively 
employs various armored artillery units.  
The extent of armor effectiveness on the 2S19M2 self-propelled howitzer is 
unknown, and Janes offers the following: 
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The protection offered by the hull is unclear as it is understood to be based 
on the T-72. In its standard configuration the T-72A is built from rolled 
homogeneous armour that is further protected by Combination-K armour. 
This provides the vehicle with protection from earlier generation anti-tank 
rounds, but it is unclear whether this level of protection is offered to the 
vehicle. The turret is understood to protect only against small arms fire and 
primarily artillery fragmentation (Janes 2021).  
Given the uncertainty surrounding the level of armor, the modeler assumed that the 
2S19 turret is comprised of one inch, or 25mm, of armor with which Red cannon firing 
agents were built in MANA. This factor is changed in the FIRECAP states of Default State, 
Squad Taken Shot, and Squad Shot At (see Chapter III, Figure 14).  
The conventional Red force built in MANA consists of two 2S19M2 batteries and 
one BM-21 ‘Grad’ MLRS battery. The modeler defines a unique Red factor as the 
composition of the force varying between this construct and one in which three 2S19M2 
batteries and no MLRS comprise the force. This factor is changed through back-end 
mapping.  
E. EXPERIMENT METHODOLOGY 
An incremental experiment methodology is developed to build intuition and draw 
conclusions about the factors most influential to Blue lethality and survivability. 
Experiment one evaluates the range of possibilities if Blue and Red forces were to engage 
in battle as currently constructed. Experiment two examines the relative benefit of different 
Blue employment methods against the current Red force. Experiment three varies Blue 
factors to determine the most significant factors against the current Red force. Experiment 
four varies both Blue and Red factors to determine the most significant factors for success 
against variable and unknown Red force capabilities.  
1. Experiment One: Fight Tonight—Base Case 
In experiment one, a base case is established. In this experiment, Blue and Red are 
constructed with parameters to best approximate the current capabilities and tactics 
employed by USMC and Russian artillery. The results of this experiment lend insight into 
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the range of results that may be observed if these forces were to engage as currently 
equipped.  
2. Experiment Two: Train Tomorrow—Blue Employment Method  
Experiment two envisions the same Blue and Red capabilities, but varies the 
method in which Blue employs its forces. The most immediately influenced capability that 
the USMC can affect through wargaming and training is artillery employment. The results 
of this experiment lend insight into the relative impact that differing USMC artillery 
employment methods make in a counterbattery scenario against current USMC and 
Russian capabilities.  
3. Experiment Three: Optimize the Force—Blue Factors  
Holding Red forces constant, as in experiments one and two, experiment three 
varies all equipment-based and TTP-based factors for Blue. The results of this experiment 
lend insight into the most significant factors for optimal USMC configuration for lethality 
and survivability against the best approximation of the current Russian artillery force.  
4. Experiment Four: Hedge the Construct—Blue and Red Factors, 
Robust Experiment 
Experiments one, two, and three model various Blue constructs against a best-
approximation Red force. Experiment four varies both Blue and Red factors. By varying 
Red factors through a carefully selected range of factor levels, true Russian capabilities are 
likely captured within the design space. The results of experiment four lend insight into the 
most robust USMC configuration to address a Russian artillery force of uncertain 
capability.  
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V. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
An efficient DOE strives to balance competing priorities of maximizing the quality 
of data to determine the relative importance of various factors and minimizing the 
computational work required. This chapter defines the factors explored in each experiment, 
establishes the levels between which these factors vary, discusses the manner in which each 
efficient DOE was constructed, and discusses the determination of adequate replications.  
A. EXPERIMENT ONE: FIGHT TONIGHT—BASE CASE 
In experiment one, both Blue and Red are built as a best approximation of current 
USMC and Russian capabilities and tactics. See Appendix B for a summary of current 
conventional USMC and Russian forces used to construct Blue and Red for the base case.  
As no factors are varied, a DOE is not required for experiment one. The stochastic 
nature of MANA introduces variability across multiple simulation runs. The variance 
across replications serves as a benchmark for the range of expected results if the two 
conventional forces engage as currently constructed. The base case is run for 200 
replications, and results are presented in Chapter VI.  
B. EXPERIMENT TWO: TRAIN TOMORROW—BLUE EMPLOYMENT  
Experiment two examines the relative differences in Blue lethality and survivability 
by varying the employment method used. The employment method, which is determined 
by four different MANA simulation scenarios, is the only factor varied. For each of the 
four employment methods, 200 replications were conducted.  
Although results are presented in Chapter VI, the results were influential in 
determining the number of replications required for subsequent experiments and thus are 
discussed in this section.  
A power analysis is conducted to determine the number of replications sufficient 
for each design point in subsequent experiments. After each employment method was run 
for 200 replications, histograms for Blue Casualties were plotted and the standard deviation 
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was estimated. The case with the largest standard deviation was selected to calculate the 
sample size required.  







where 𝜎𝜎 is the standard deviation estimate, 𝑍𝑍𝛼𝛼 is the z-score for the desired confidence 
interval capability, 𝑍𝑍𝛽𝛽 is the z-score for power, 𝜇𝜇0– 𝜇𝜇′is the practical difference to be 
detected, and 𝑛𝑛 is the sample size required. 
Blue Casualties displayed the highest standard deviation of 3.22 in the Distributed 
case. With a desired 95% confidence interval (𝑍𝑍𝛼𝛼 = 1.96), power of 0.85 (𝑍𝑍𝛽𝛽 = 1.04), and 
practical difference of Blue Casualty detection of one, the resulting minimum sample size 
was calculated (𝑛𝑛) as 94. For convenience, this was rounded to 100. Therefore, for 
subsequent experiments, 100 replications per design point is used to achieve 95% 
confidence intervals and 85% power for detecting a difference of one Blue casualty. Figure 
20 shows the graphical determination of sample size given a desired Blue Casualty 
detection resolution of one and 95% confidence intervals with a power of 0.85.  
 
Figure 20. Power Analysis, Sample Size Determination 
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C. EXPERIMENT THREE: OPTIMIZE THE FORCE—BLUE FACTORS  
In experiment three, Blue factors are varied against a best approximated Red force. 
Having identified the model data input corresponding to each factor and simulation 
scenario for each Employment Method level, a DOE is built to vary the factors over an 
interval of levels. Figure 21 displays a summary of Blue factors varied in experiment three.  
 
Figure 21. Experiment Three Factor and Level Summary 
In total, 10 factors are identified for evaluation. These include two categorical, five 
continuous, and three discrete factors. Each categorical factor has a specific number of 
levels. The levels for Blue Employment Method are the four employment methods and is 
controlled by the four separate simulation scenarios. The Blue Caliber/Projectile Strength 
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factor includes the 155mm and 105mm projectile, each with respective kinetic strength and 
armor penetration probabilities. The discrete and continuous factors are varied over an 
appropriate range of factor levels. The Low and High columns establish the lower and 
upper bound of each continuous and discrete factor range. To construct an efficient DOE 
over all factors, component DOEs are constructed and crossed. Each component DOE has 
properties that make it a good choice for its purpose, and the final design yields the benefit 
of having used each component piece to accomplish a specific goal.  
First, a full factorial is constructed over the categorical factors. This establishes a 
design point for each unique combination of categorical factor levels. The full factorial of 
categorical factors results in an eight-design point DOE, as seen in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22. Categorical Factor Full Factorial Design 
The discrete and continuous factors can be evaluated over a three-dimensional 
design space, visualized as a cube. The Resolution IV Fractional Factorial establishes the 
corner points, or most extreme points, of the cube. The Resolution IV Fractional Factorial 
only evaluates the maximum and minimum factor levels and guarantees that main effects 
are not aliased with two-way interactions. The Resolution IV Fractional Factorial results 
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in a 16-design-point DOE. Figure 23 shows how the Resolution IV Fractional Factorial 
establishes the corner points of the cube for three of the factors.  
 
Figure 23. Discrete and Continuous Factor Scaled Resolution IV Fractional 
Factorial Design 
Having established the corner points of the discrete and continuous cube in the 
Resolution IV Fractional Factorial, the cube is then filled in using a Nearly Orthogonal and 
Balanced (NOB) design. A design is called nearly orthogonal if the absolute maximum 
pairwise correlation between any two columns of the design matrix is less than 0.05 
(Hernandez et al. 2012). This will ensure minimal multicollinearity affects for main effect 
terms. The balance property ensures that each level of each factor is (ideally) equally 
sampled. The NOB is an efficient, space-filling, and flexible design which can handle 
multiple factor types (Vieira et al. 2013). The NOBs in this research were calculated using 
a genetic algorithm (MacCalman et al. 2017). The constructed NOB results in a 25-design-
point DOE. Figure 24 shows the interior space-filling achieved with the NOB.  
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Figure 24. Discrete and Continuous Factor Nearly Orthogonal and Balanced 
Design 
The 16 design point Resolution IV Fractional Factorial and 25 design point NOB 
are combined together to complete the discrete and continuous design space, resulting in a 
41 design point DOE. Figure 25 shows the corner points established in the Resolution IV 
Fractional Factorial and the space filling points from the NOB for three factors.  
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Figure 25. Discrete and Continuous Factor Res IV Full Factorial + NOB 
Design 
Finally, the eight design point categorical full factorial DOE is crossed with the 41 
design point NOB, resulting in a final 328 design point DOE for this experiment. Crossing 
the design over important categorical factors with the design for the discrete and continuous 
factors is desirable when computationally feasible because it allows every combination of 
the categorical factors to be run against exactly the same set of other factor variations. 
Figure 26 visualizes how the eight design point categorical full factorial crossed with the 
Resolution IV Fractional Factorial plus NOB creates a cube design space for each unique 
combination of categorical factors.  
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Figure 26. Full Factorial Crossed with (Res IV Fractional Factorial + NOB) 
Final Design 
D. EXPERIMENT FOUR: HEDGE THE CONSTRUCT—BLUE AND RED 
FACTORS, ROBUST EXPERIMENT 
In experiment four, both Blue and Red factors are varied. By varying factors on 
both sides, robust solutions can be attained. A robust solution for Blue is one in which the 
Blue construct is “not overly sensitive to small changes in the [Red] inputs” (Sanchez et 
al. 2020). By varying Red factors over carefully selected levels, true Russian capabilities 
are likely captured at some point in the design space. The intent of the robust experiment 
is to determine an optimal Blue construct that is resilient to variations in Red factors.  
Figure 27 displays a summary of the two Blue and one Red categorical factors 
varied in experiment four. Factors one and two are identical to those in experiment three. 
Factor three, or Red MLRS, evaluates two levels. The first level imagines a composite Red 
force consisting of two cannon batteries and one MLRS battery, as previously assumed in 
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experiments one through three. The second level imagines a pure Red force consisting of 
three identical cannon batteries and no MLRS battery.  
 
Figure 27. Experiment Four Categorical Factors and Levels Summary 
Figure 28 displays a summary of the eight Blue and eight Red discrete and 
continuous factors varied in experiment four. Blue and Red vary the same factors in seven 
of eight respective cases, albeit with different factor levels unique to each side. The factor 
unique to Blue is Time to Survivability Move. Red does not consider this factor as it 
maintains defensive positions with no survivability moves conducted. The factor unique to 
Red is Armor Thickness. Blue does not consider this factor as Blue does not currently 




Figure 28. Experiment Four Discrete and Continuous Factors and Levels 
Summary 
The DOE for experiment four is constructed in the same manner as experiment 
three with one additional step. Sub-DOEs are constructed for both Red and Blue by 
crossing the categorical full factorial with the combination of the discrete and continuous 
NOB and Resolution III fractional factorial. After Blue and Red sub-DOEs are constructed, 
the sub-DOEs are crossed. The final DOE for experiment four consists of 13,456 design 
points, significantly more than the 328 design points obtained in experiment three.  
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E. IMPORTANCE OF EFFICIENT DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
The importance of efficient space-filling design of experiments cannot be 
overstated. As an example, the experiment four DOE obtained using efficient designs with 
good space-filling properties results in 13,456 design points. Assuming 180 processors 
available on a cluster computer, 20 second replication run times, and 100 replications per 
design point, experiment four can be completed in 1.7 days. If a full factorial of all factors 
were constructed, evaluating discrete and continuous factors at only three levels (low, mid, 
and high), the full factorial design would result in 688,747,536 design points. Under the 
same cluster computer, replication run time, and replications per design point assumptions, 
this theorized full factorial would take over 242 years to run.  
In the above example, one might be led to believe that more explanatory 
information is captured in the exhaustive full factorial design. This is not necessarily the 
case. The theorized full factorial evaluates discrete and continuous factors at only three 
levels, whereas the efficient DOE evaluates throughout the factor level space. This is the 
principal benefit of the space-filling properties of the NOB. Although the full factorial’s 
high number of design points enables better estimation of second order effects, the more 
efficient space-filling design allows for the possibility for estimating effects higher than 
second order (as it is not limited to three levels per factor) and detecting change points 
(Cioppa and Lucas 2007).  
By implementing efficient designs of experiment, computational time is reduced, 
and high order effect analysis is possible. In totality, this thesis evaluated 13,788 design 
points over the course of the four experiments, for a total of over 1.3 million simulated 
artillery engagements. The total run time for this thesis was less than 48 hours.  
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This chapter presents analysis for each of the four experiments developed in 
Chapters IV and V. The sequential experiment methodology progressively builds intuition 
into the research objectives of this study, informed by identifying factor significance for 
lethality and survivability. As equipment and TTP based factors are identified as 
significant, findings lead to the development of a TTP decision tree to assist commanders 
in selecting the most advantageous tactics for success in a counterbattery fight. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion about robust Blue artillery constructs against both a hybrid and 
cannon-pure Red force construct.  
A. EXPERIMENT ONE: FIGHT TONIGHT—BASE CASE 
In experiment one, Blue and Red are constructed with equipment attributes 
mirroring current respective USMC and Russian capabilities and conventional 
employment methods. The experiment establishes a baseline for the range of possibilities 
that may be seen if the two forces were to engage as currently equipped and deployed. No 
factors are changed in experiment one, and the simulation is run for 200 independent 
replications. 
1. Experiment One Analysis  
This thesis defines a casualty as a destroyed artillery piece. As seen in Figure 29, 
Blue forces often exhibit higher casualties than Red. The median Blue casualties are 15, or 
83% of Blue artillery pieces, while Red sustains median casualties of six, or 33% of Red 
artillery pieces. Given the shape and modality of the histograms for Blue and Red 
casualties, it is observed that Red is frequently dominant in terms of lethality and 
survivability. It is also striking how much natural variability there is, as Blue losses range 
from six to 18 artillery pieces and Red’s from zero to 13. 
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Figure 29. Base Case Casualties 
This thesis assumes that attriting Red artillery pieces to half the original force level 
is favorable for Blue to continue its seizure of the expeditionary airfield. For a time-based 
perspective, the time at which 50% of the Red artillery force is killed is evaluated. In 
experiment one, Blue was successful at achieving at least 50% Red attrition only 38 times, 
or 19% of all simulations. In other words, Blue failed to shape the battlefield for success 
in 81% of all replications. Figure 30 shows that in these 38 cases, it took Blue between 65 
and 158 minutes to achieve this goal, with a mean time of 108 minutes. While this metric 




Figure 30. Base Case Time to Kill 50% Red Artillery 
Although the flow of logistics is outside of the scope of this study, the amount of 
ammunition expended by Blue is analyzed to ensure that conceptual equipment and 
employment constructs are within feasible support bounds. Figure 31 shows the range of 
total Battalion ammunition expenditures across the 200 base case replications. Although 
variability remains high, the upmost outlier is below 1,000 rounds, and ammunition 
expenditure is not outside of feasible bounds. This metric becomes more comparatively 
powerful in subsequent experiments.  
 
Figure 31. Base Case Blue Battalion Ammunition Used 
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2. Experiment One Insights 
 The base case established in experiment one serves as a comparative 
benchmark for subsequent experiments. The primary insight drawn from experiment one 
is that, assuming that the simulation is representative of USMC and Russian capabilities 
and employment, current USMC cannon artillery would sustain high casualties compared 
to Russian forces and fail to set conditions for success if the forces were to engage in battle 
as currently constructed. Experiment two builds from this conclusion and evaluates the 
effect of altering only one factor in the pursuit of tactical superiority.  
B. EXPERIMENT TWO: TRAIN TOMORROW—BLUE EMPLOYMENT 
METHOD 
Experiment two maintains the equipment capabilities of current USMC and 
Russian forces, but alters the employment method of Blue. Unlike developing, testing, and 
fielding new equipment, the Marine Corps can train to different employment methods 
immediately. This experiment evaluates the comparative results of these potential training 
priorities.  
1. Experiment Two Analysis 
The four employment options, from most concentrated to most dispersed, are 
consolidated, split battery, section, and distributed. Each employment method simulation 
is run for 200 independent replications.  
Figure 32 displays the casualty boxplots for Blue and Red by various Blue 
employment methods. A clear trend emerges for both Blue and Red casualties. As the Blue 
force becomes more dispersed, Blue casualties become lower and Red casualties rise. This 
is indicative of an increase in both Blue survivability and lethality.  
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Figure 32. Blue and Red Casualties by Blue Employment Method 
With increased dispersion, Blue cannons are less susceptible to catastrophic Red 
massing of fires. As Blue increases survivability through dispersion, the average lifetime 
of each Blue artillery piece increases. The survival of more Blue firing pieces equates to 
more assets available to fire, and tempo (ability to inflict Red casualties rapidly) and 
momentum for Blue is increased.  
Near parity in casualty medians is achieved in the section employment method, and 
Blue gains an advantage in the distributed case. It is important to note that while Blue 
appears to have an advantage in median casualties in the distributed case, Blue and Red 
variability remains high.  
A Kruskal-Wallis test at the 0.05 significance level results in a P-value less than 
0.0001 and confirms that Blue and Red casualty means are not the same for all employment 
methods (Devore 2014, p. 671). A post-hoc Tukey’s procedure produces P-values less than 
0.0001 between all employment methods, which supports the assertion that no employment 
methods share a common mean Red or Blue casualty count (Devore 2014, p. 420). 
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As dispersion increases, more cases are observed in which at least 50% of Red 
forces are killed. This is due to the increase in Blue lethality and survivability, and Figure 
33 shows the percentage of replications in which Blue reaches this goal. 
 
Figure 33. Percentage of Replications in which Blue Kills >50% Red Artillery 
Figure 34 shows the boxplots of the time to destroy 50% of Red artillery pieces by 
employment method. Although the number of replications for which Blue achieves this 
goal changes based on employment method, the trend is that more Blue dispersion results 
in a faster time to kill 50% of Red artillery when this goal is met. The slight median increase 
from consolidated to split battery employment is small, not statistically significant, and is 
likely due to chance. A Kruskal-Wallis test at the 0.05 significance level results in a P-
value less than 0.0001 and confirms time to kill 50% Red artillery medians are not the same 
for all employment methods (Devore 2014, p. 671). 
65 
 
Figure 34. Time to Kill 50% Red Artillery by Employment Method 
With a demonstrated relationship between dispersion and survivability, there is an 
expectation that the quantity of rounds expended by the Blue Battalion increases. Figure 
35 shows this increase. However, the increase in rounds expended is not outside of the 
range of feasible battalion support, even at the upmost outlier in the distributed case. Again, 
a Kruskal-Wallis test at the 0.05 significance level results in a P-value less than 0.0001 and 
confirms ammunition expenditure means are not the same for all employment methods 
(Devore 2014, p. 671). 
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Figure 35. Blue Battalion Ammunition Used by Employment Method 
2. Experiment Two Insights 
By altering the method by which USMC artillery is employed, a tactical advantage 
can be gained by Blue while maintaining the current equipment set. By increasing 
dispersion, Blue gains an increase in both lethality and survivability. The resulting increase 
in Blue tempo enables Blue to attrit Red below 50% force levels faster, all while 
maintaining battalion round expenditure within the feasible range of organic ammunition 
capacity or battalion support.  
C. EXPERIMENT THREE: OPTIMIZE THE FORCE—BLUE FACTORS 
Experiment three maintains the equipment capabilities of current Red forces, but 
varies a set of Blue factors. The DOE for experiment three has 328 design points, with 100 
replications per design point. For each design point, the 100-replication data is summarized 
by the mean of Blue and Red casualties.  
Figure 36 shows a scatterplot of Blue and Red casualty means for each unique Blue 
configuration (100 replications each). The blue box shows runs in which Blue sustained 
less than 50% casualties while inflicting over 50% casualties on Red. The red box shows 
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the inverse case in which Red inflicted more than 50% casualties on Blue while losing less 
than 50% Red. Blue and Red casualties are negatively correlated with a correlation of –
0.5162. There are clearly many more cases in which the outcome of the battle was favorable 
to Red. The intent of the remainder of this analysis for experiment three is to determine 
which Blue factors are most critical to achieving conditions that lower Blue casualties and 
increase Red casualties, visualized approximately as the area within the favorable blue box.  
 
Figure 36. Blue and Red Casualty Scatterplot 
Figure 37 shows the histograms of Blue and Red casualties across all 328 
summarized design points. Blue casualties are markedly higher than Red with a histogram 
peak around 15. However, Blue casualties exhibit a long left tail, suggesting that there are 
solutions in which Blue casualties are much lower. Conversely, the Red casualty histogram 
has a prominent peak around one but has a long right tail with a prominent dip between the 
two modes. This dip is indicative of an influential factor or interaction with a subset of 
Blue factors.  
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Figure 37. Red and Blue Casualty Histograms 
1. Blue Lethality Partition Tree 
To identify which factors most influence Red casualties, a partition tree is created 
using Red casualties as the response, as seen in Figure 38. After seven splits, an R-squared 
value of 0.91 is obtained, as seen in the yellow box. An R-squared value of this magnitude 
achieved from a stochastic, mission-level model is powerful, and suggests that 91% of Red 
casualties in the simulation can be explained within the seven splits.  
 
Figure 38. Blue Lethality Partition Tree 
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As the Red casualty mean corresponds with the histogram inner-mode dip (see the 
blue arrow), it can be reasonably assumed that the first split in the tree will determine what 
causes the separation between the two modes. The first split is Blue caliber, with Blue 
155mm dramatically raising Red casualties. The scenarios in which Blue used 105mm 
howitzers resulted in mean Red casualties of 1.09 and a small standard deviation of 0.73, 
as seen in the top red box. This shows that Blue caliber is the dominant factor in 
determining Red casualties, or Blue lethality.  
Continuing down the right most side of the partition tree, the factors for increased 
Blue lethality are identified in green boxes. Among these are a more distributed 
employment method (dispersed being ideal), a maximum range above 14,685 meters, and 
an offensive rate of fire greater than or equal to five rounds per minute.  
Figure 39 shows the column contributions for each of the factors. Again, it is noted 
that Blue caliber is the dominant factor in blue lethality, contributing over 86% explanatory 
power in the regression tree.  
 
Figure 39. Blue Lethality Partition Tree Column Contributions 
Figure 40 shows a histogram for Red casualties after controlling for Blue caliber. 
This shows that Blue is at a decisive disadvantage when employing 105mm cannons as its 
lethality is significantly reduced with the smaller projectile. The two distinct and separate 
histograms show that the inner-mode dip point initially detected in Figure 37 is due to the 
subsets of Blue caliber design point simulations.  
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Figure 40. Red Casualty Histograms by Blue Caliber 
2. Blue Survivability Partition Tree 
Blue survivability is analyzed by creating a regression tree with Blue casualties as 
the response, as seen in Figure 41. After nine splits, an R-squared value of 0.642 is 
obtained, as seen in the yellow box. This R-squared value is lower than that obtained for 
Blue lethality, suggesting that a greater number of factors and interactions influence Blue 
survivability. 
 
Figure 41. Blue Survivability Partition Tree 
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The first and most significant split relates to Blue employment method. Reinforcing 
the findings of experiment two, the distributed employment method results in a reduced 
number of casualties for Blue. The second most important split for increasing Blue 
survivability is a selection of 155mm Blue caliber. This suggests that Blue survivability is 
correlated with Blue lethality. By increasing lethality through a more powerful round 
(caliber), Blue is able to destroy Red forces faster, thus gaining a tempo advantage.  
Along the red branch of the tree, which constitutes the worst conditions for Blue 
survivability, it is seen that Blue caliber does not appear until the fourth split. The nodes 
above Blue caliber are employment method and displacement time. If Blue is not able to 
disperse forces in the dispersed employment method, it is important for Blue to have the 
capability to displace quickly (within 99 seconds), prior to counterbattery rounds impacting 
the position.  
Figure 42 shows the column contributions to the Blue survivability partition tree. 
Employment method is vitally important, accounting for over 60% of the explanatory 
power. Although displacement time only accounts for 18% of the column contributions, it 
is critical to have a fast displacement time if dispersion of forces cannot be practiced. The 
12% contribution for Blue caliber suggests that the capability to destroy Red forces is 
important for gaining a survivability tempo advantage, perhaps best captured in the adage 
that ‘the [third] best defense is a good offense.’  
 
Figure 42. Blue Survivability Partition Tree Column Contributions 
3. Partition Tree Dominant Factors 
Caliber and employment method are dominant for lethality and survivability, 
respectively. Figure 43 shows a similar plot to that obtained in experiment two, but now 
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displayed by caliber in addition to employment method. It is clear that if Blue uses 105mm 
cannons, lethality is not effectively increased, even when more dispersed. However, when 
Blue uses 155mm cannons and disperses forces, lethality and survivability both increase 
dramatically.  
 
Figure 43. Blue and Red Casualties by Blue Caliber and Employment Method 
Referring back to Figure 36, the majority of observations were favorable to Red. 
After identifying the factors of Blue employment method and caliber as critical to Blue 
lethality and survivability, the scatterplot is reconstructed, this time displayed by these 




Figure 44. Casualty Clusters by Blue Caliber and Employment Method 
Regardless of employment method, a Blue construct with 105mm cannons always 
results in low Red casualties and mid to high Blue casualties, with the majority of outcomes 
residing in the unfavorable, red box. However, when constructed with 155mm cannons, 
the distribution of outcomes is more pronounced and varied for both Blue and Red 
casualties. Clusters are constructed around different employment methods, with each 
cluster containing at least 90% of the representative employment method. Although there 
is significant overlap, it is clear that more dispersion corresponds with fewer Blue 
casualties and more Red casualties, with the most prominent points in the favorable blue 
box being 155mm howitzers employed in distributed or section methods.  
4. Blue Lethality Linear Regression 
A stepwise linear regression metamodel is built using Red casualties (Blue 
lethality) as the response. Figure 45 provides a summary of important aspects of the Blue 
lethality model. A full third order model is considered. Using the p-value threshold of 0.01 
as the stopping rule, the model is manually stepped until diminishing returns were 
observed, achieving an adjusted R-squared value of 0.926 (outlined in yellow box). 
Adjusted R-squared injects a penalty for the number of predictors used in the construction 
of the model to discourage overfitting. The Residual by Predicted plot appears to produce 
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an approximate mean residual of zero, but variance is not constant. Therefore, this model 
does not meet all regression assumptions. However, a great deal (nearly 93%) of variation 
in the simulation is captured and explained in this metamodel. Moreover, we are using the 
metamodel not for prediction, but as a readily interpretable approximation to the simulation 
as a means for understanding (Kleijnen et al. 2005). The author determined that use of a 
transformation, higher order terms, or different regression method would complicate 
interpretation while providing little benefit. Therefore, although the model fit is not perfect, 
the model is considered reasonable and useful for the purpose of this analysis, given that 
the goal is understanding and not prediction 
 
Figure 45. Blue Lethality Linear Regression Model 
The sorted parameter estimates display the most significant predictors and 
interactions in the model, sorted by the absolute value of the t-ratio (magnitude of 
significance). The three most meaningful predictors for Blue lethality are caliber, 
employment method, and maximum range (outlined in blue box). The horizontal bar on 
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the right side of the sorted parameter estimates window offers a visual depiction of the 
magnitude of significance. The direction of the horizontal bar shows the directionality of 
the effect on the response (a bar to the left decreases the response, and a bar to the right 
increases the response). Here, we see that caliber is the dominant factor and is 
overwhelmingly influential in Blue lethality. The estimate, or coefficient, signifies the 
extent to which the expected value of the response is affected by the predictor when all 
other predictors are held constant. For example, the categorical predictor of caliber can 
take on a value of either 155mm or 105mm. In this model, not including interactions, we 
see that if Blue uses 105mm cannons, then 3.75 fewer Red casualties (on average) are 
produced compared to a situation in which Blue uses 155mm cannons. The second most 
important predictor is consolidated employment method, specifically showing that 
operating in a consolidated method contributes negatively to Blue lethality. The third most 
influential predictor is maximum range. As this predictor is continuous, the coefficient 
(0.0001345) is interpreted as the average main-effect-by-itself increase to Red casualties 
for every meter of additional range capability. This coefficient means that Blue can produce 
0.1345 more Red casualties for every 1000m of additional range, or one additional Red 
casualty for every 7435m of additional range. 
5. Blue Survivability Linear Regression 
For Blue survivability, a stepwise linear regression model is built using Blue 
casualties as the response. Figure 46 provides a summary of important aspects of the Blue 
survivability model. All possible three-way interactions are considered. Using the p-value 
threshold of 0.01 as the stopping rule, the model is manually stepped until diminishing 




Figure 46. Blue Survivability Linear Regression Model 
The most significant predictors for Blue survivability (outlined in blue box) are 
employment method, caliber, and two three-way interactions. The sorted parameter 
estimate window does not suggest that any one factor is dominant, but rather that multiple 
factors are significant for Blue survivability. This is reinforced by the lower adjusted R-
squared value as compared to the Blue lethality model.  
Similar to the findings in the Blue survivability partition tree, employment method 
and caliber are the two most significant factors for Blue survivability. Specifically, 
consolidated employment method should be avoided entirely, as should split battery 
(appearing as the sixth most important factor). Blue caliber is the second most significant, 
and it is critical that 155mm be used by Blue to reduce the number of Blue casualties.  
The largest benefit of fitting a linear regression model is the consideration and 
inclusion of two and three-way interactions. The second third and fourth most influential 
predictors in this model are both three-way interactions involving continuous factors: 
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defensive fire, time to conduct a survivability move, and time to emplace or time to displace 
after incoming fire. The simplest interpretation of a three-way interaction is that the 
interaction between any two factors is dependent on the third. Similarly, a two-way 
interaction is one in which one variable is dependent on the other. Although three-way 
interactions and the relationship to the response creates a four-dimensional surface, the 
effects of each component of the three-way interaction can be plotted carefully to extract 
insights.  
Figure 47 shows the first three-way interaction that appears in the Blue survivability 
model (third most important predictor). This interaction is comprised of defensive rate of 
fire, time to survivability move, and emplacement time. The relationship between Blue 
casualties and the continuous values of these three factors is visualized by reducing 
defensive rate of fire into two categories ([4-8) rounds per minute and [8-10] rounds per 
minute), and emplacement time into three categories ([30-135) seconds, [135-374) 
seconds, and [374-480] seconds). With Blue casualties represented on the Y axis, the 
direction and magnitude of the slope describes the three-way interaction. For example, on 
the left-most plot (defensive rate of fire between four and eight rounds per minute), the 
most positive slope is the blue line, which represents an emplacement time between 30 and 
135 seconds. The interpretation is that when defensive rates of fire are low and a unit can 
be emplaced quickly, the time to survivability move should be kept low. In this situation, 
Blue casualties grow proportional to the time until a survivability move is conducted.  
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Figure 47. Three-Way Interaction One: Defensive Rate of Fire, Time to 
Survivability Move, Emplacement Time 
The most significant observation in Figure 47 is the change of slope directionality 
of the blue and green lines from the left plot to the right plot. When defensive rates of fire 
are low (left plot), and emplacement times are low (blue line), survivability moves should 
occur with more frequency in order to reduce Blue casualties. This situation allows the 
quickly emplacable units to move positions often and reduce the probability of being 
detected and fired upon, negating the disadvantage of a low defensive rate of fire. However, 
when defensive rates of fire are low (left plot) and emplacement times are high (green line), 
then it is advantageous to lengthen the amount of time until a survivability move is 
conducted. The slope is negative, which means that it is more advantageous to stay 
FIRECAP (responsive) awaiting missions rather than moving frequently and losing time 
available to fire due to a long emplacement time.  
However, the same relationship is not true when Blue possesses a high defensive 
rate of fire (right plot). The slopes of the blue and green lines are opposite in directionality 
compared to low defensive rate of fire. Looking at the green line (long emplacement time) 
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specifically, a narrative interpretation is that when defensive rate of fire is high, it is more 
advantageous to remain FIRECAP for a short period of time before conducting a 
survivability move. While this may be beneficial to survivability (long emplacement times 
and frequent moves render the agent undetectable for long amounts of time), it likely does 
not contribute significantly to Blue lethality (non-FIRECAP units are unable to remove 
Red from the battlefield). A more practical case is the inversed slope of fast emplacement 
(blue line) units in high defensive rate of fire (right plot) situations. Here, a unit is able to 
emplace quickly but casualties are decreased when waiting in position for longer. This is 
because remaining in position offers more opportunities to be detected and fired upon, 
thereby allowing the unit to take advantage of a fast defensive rate of fire. After 
counterfiring, the unit is able to move to a new position and emplace quickly. Although an 
‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ rate of fire is more controlled in simulation than real world 
engagements, this is a testament to the importance of high rate of fire capability.  
Figure 48 summarizes this interaction with the TTP decision of time until a 
survivability move is as a result of unit capabilities of defensive rate of fire and 
emplacement time.  
 
Figure 48. Three-Way Interaction One: Decision Summary 
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Figure 49 shows the second three-way interaction that appears in the Blue 
survivability model (fourth most important predictor). This interaction is comprised of 
defensive rate of fire, time to survivability move, and displacement time after receiving 
incoming fire. Displacement time after receiving incoming fire is synonymous with the 
amount of time a unit remains in position returning fire (counterfire).  
 
Figure 49. Three-Way Interaction Two: Defensive Rate of Fire, Time to 
Survivability Move, Displacement After Incoming 
Similar to the first interaction, the most significant observation in Figure 49 is the 
change of slope directionality between the blue and green lines. When defensive rates of 
fire are low (left plot), and time to return fire after incoming are low (blue line), time until 
a survivability move should be increased in order to reduce Blue casualties. The 
interpretation is that if a unit has a low defensive rate of fire and elects to displace quickly 
after receiving incoming fire, it is advantageous to conduct survivability moves less 
frequently. This tactic presents the opportunity for a unit to conduct more offensive fire 
missions with a move most often triggered by the receipt of fires. The opposite is true for 
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units with a low defensive rate of fire (left plot) and long time to remain in position and 
return fire (green line). In this situation, a unit with a longer time to remain in position and 
return fire is better served to reduce the amount of time to a survivability move. If a unit 
has a low defensive rate of fire and elects to remain in position returning fire for a long 
amount of time, it is better to decrease the time until a survivability move is conducted. 
The purpose of this tactic is to continue to move forward and close distance through short 
survivability move windows while an identical friendly unit continually draws counterfire 
through a longer counterfire window. By having one Blue unit draw Red fires, sister units 
are able to take advantage of a higher offensive rate of fire in support.  
The inverse relationship is true for the case in which a unit has a high defensive rate 
of fire (right plot). In this case, a unit with a low time to displacement after incoming fire 
(blue line) reduces Blue casualties the most when time to survivability move is low. A unit 
that practices movement quickly after receiving fire is best served by conducting 
survivability moves frequently. This creates more opportunities for the unit to be fired 
upon, thereby taking advantage of a fast defensive rate of fire prior to a quick displacement. 
Conversely, when a unit remains in positions returning fire for a long amount of time (green 
line), it is advantageous to increase the amount of time until a survivability move. This 
increases the probability that a unit will be detected and fired upon, thereby enabling the 
unit to take advantage of an increased defensive rate of fire for a long amount of time. This 
tactic is in line with gaining fires superiority through kinetic exchange.  
Figure 50 summarizes this interaction with the TTP decision of time until a 
survivability move is as a result of unit capabilities of defensive rate of fire and time to 
displacement after incoming fires.  
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Figure 50. Three-Way Interaction Two: Decision Summary 
6. Experiment Three Insights 
Blue lethality is most influenced by the dominant factor of caliber. Using a 155mm 
caliber howitzer contributes significantly to a more lethal USMC artillery force, to the point 
that 105mm caliber cannons should not be considered as a viable howitzer caliber for a 
counterfire engagement with current Russian forces.  
Blue survivability is not as clear cut as Blue lethality, as there is no single 
dominating factor for decreasing Blue casualties. Instead, a range of prioritized factors is 
considered. First, employment method is critically important to Blue survivability. 
Reinforcing the findings in experiment two, the Blue force is significantly disadvantaged 
in survivability when consolidated. Second, the Blue force is at an advantage in 
survivability when using a 155mm howitzer, supporting the concurrent priority of Blue 
lethality. Finally, the interactions between defensive rate of fire, time to survivability move, 
and emplacement time or displacement time after incoming fires are significant in 
providing insights to TTPs derived from unit capabilities. A flow chart of unit capabilities 
and resulting TTP decisions for reduction of Blue casualties is presented in Figure 51.  
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Figure 51. TTP Decision Tree 
D. EXPERIMENT FOUR: HEDGE THE CONSTRUCT—BLUE & RED 
FACTORS, ROBUST ANALYSIS 
In the context of this thesis, the end state is a Blue artillery construct that performs 
well in terms of lethality and survivability against a Red force. Experiments one, two, and 
three evaluated various Blue constructs against a consistent, best-approximation Red force. 
Altering controllable Blue factors allowed for analysis on relative performance across the 
Blue factor space. Experiment four “unlocks” the previously consistent Red force by 
explicitly varying Red force factors, akin to testing a wide range of potential Red artillery 
configurations. If Blue factors are considered to be controllable decision factors, the Red 
factors can be considered to be uncontrollable factors. By introducing uncontrollable 
factors, insights into Blue factor importance can be gained not only to increase 
performance, but also to ensure that performance is relatively consistent across a wide 
range of Red capabilities and tactics.  
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1. Intent of Robust Design and Analysis 
A robust design is a “system optimization and improvement process that springs 
from the view that a system should not be evaluated on the basis of mean performance 
alone” (Sanchez and Sanchez 2020, p. 6-25). Robust analysis enables the construction of a 
system of processes which “exhibit an acceptable mean performance” while remaining 
“relatively insensitive to uncontrollable sources of variation present in the system’s 
environment” (Sanchez and Sanchez 2020, p. 6-25). 
Within this context, improving mean performance for Blue lethality and 
survivability means increasing Red casualties and reducing Blue casualties, respectively. 
A Blue artillery configuration is ‘robust’ when it reduces variability (from uncontrolled 
Red noise factors) while still performing at or near the goals of achieving few Blue 
casualties and many Red casualties, on average.  
One can imagine a three-dimensional fitness landscape where height represents 
performance. A robust configuration for the Blue force is one which resides on a high, flat 
plateau, as opposed to on top of a higher, “optimal” configuration that resides on top of a 
fragile “pointy” peak. The “optimal” peak configuration would be subject to failure given 
even a small amount of change from assumed conditions that are, in fact, uncertain. The 
robust configuration, residing on the plateau, would be resilient to variation and continue 
to produce good results.  
Approaching analysis from a robust perspective enables recommendations for 
future force design and employment that are not merely based on mean performance, but 
also consider uncertainty and variability with respect to future Russian operating 
capabilities and tactics.  
2. Loss Function 
A loss function penalizes the distance away from a target value for a particular 
metric, multiplied by a scalar that can be used as a cost conversion. The quadratic loss 
function, with distance from target squared, so as to be in the same units as variance, is 
given by 
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥) = 𝑐𝑐(𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 − 𝜏𝜏)2 
where ‘c’ is a penalty/cost constant, tau (𝜏𝜏) is the target value and 𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 is the response for 
each x design point.  
In the experiment four design, each unique Blue design point (232 total) is run for 
100 replications over 58 unique Red configurations for a total of 5800 replications per Blue 
design point. Each run includes variability due to the stochastic nature of MANA as well 
as the change in Red factor settings. By collapsing the 5800 data points by unique Blue 
design point, summary statistics for the mean and standard deviation of each design point 
is obtained over the entire noise space. The expected loss function imposes penalties for 
both variability and mean value distance from the target with the following equation: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥)] = 𝑐𝑐 �(𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥)
2 + �𝜇𝜇𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 − 𝜏𝜏�
2
� 
In this study, the two response metrics are Blue lethality and Blue survivability. 
Lethality is measured in the number of Red casualties inflicted by Blue and survivability 
is measured by the number of Blue casualties sustained. With the intent to determine 
favorable Blue constructs, natural responses (𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥) and target values (tau) for these metrics 
are: 
• Blue Lethality: 𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥= Red Casualties, tau = 18 (maximum number of Red 
casualties possible) 
• Blue Survivability: 𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥= Blue Casualties, tau = 0 (minimum number of 
Blue casualties possible) 
After collapsing data, two expected loss columns for lethality and survivability are 
added using the expected loss equation with appropriate values for tau. A scatterplot is 
created by plotting Blue lethality loss (Red casualty loss) by Blue survivability loss (Blue 
casualty loss), seen in Figure 52. With the intent to minimize loss for both metrics, a Pareto 
frontier is identified along the points closest to the origin that are dominant for minimizing 
Blue and Red loss. Each point in the Pareto frontier represents a unique Blue artillery 
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construct. The point closest to the origin, highlighted in green, represents the Blue construct 
that minimizes loss for balanced priorities of lethality and survivability.  
 
Figure 52. Minimum Loss Pareto Frontier 
The preferable design point (green) along the Pareto frontier represents a Blue force 
construct with the following characteristics: 
• Employment: Distributed 
• Caliber: 155mm 
• Offensive ROF: 6 rounds/minute 
• Defensive ROF: 4 rounds/minute 
• Time to Survivability Move: 300 seconds 
• Time in Position after Incoming: 1 second 
• Concealment: 90 percent 
• Emplacement Time: 30 seconds 
• Displacement Time: 30 seconds 
• Max Range: 30,000 meters 
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While this design point construct is closest to the origin, it represents only one point 
on the Pareto frontier. Some of the parameters in the above construct may be infeasible or 
mutually contradicting to achieve. To evaluate which factors are most important in the 
robust case, partition trees and regression models are built to provide more in-depth insight.  
3. Partition Trees 
Partition trees are created for Blue casualty loss (survivability), Red casualty loss 
(lethality), and average loss (balance of survivability and lethality). In each partition tree, 
the goal is to minimize the overall loss by splitting and progressing down the left side of 
the tree.  
a. Blue Casualty Loss 
Figure 53 shows the partition tree for Blue casualty loss. After eight splits, an R 
squared value of 0.749 is attained. In order to reduce Blue causalities consistently, Blue 
should disperse forces, use a 155mm caliber weapon system, and prioritize concealment.  
 
Figure 53. Blue Casualty Loss (Blue Survivability) Partition Tree 
b. Red Casualty Loss 
Figure 54 shows the partition tree for Red casualty loss. After only five splits, a 
high R squared value of 0.922 is attained. To consistently produce high Red casualties, 
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Blue should use a 155mm caliber weapon system, possess a long-range capability of at 
least 17,000 meters, and avoid consolidated employment.  
 
Figure 54. Red Casualty Loss (Blue Lethality) Partition Tree 
c. Average Loss 
Figure 55 shows the partition tree for the average loss of Blue casualties and Red 
casualties. This metric assumes an equal priority for Blue lethality and survivability. While 
previous partition trees analyzed these metrics in isolation, this partition tree considers the 
factor splits most significant to both. After six splits, an R squared value of 0.909 is 
attained. A Blue force that consistently produces high Red casualties while sustaining low 
Blue casualties will be comprised of 155mm caliber weapon systems, employed either in 
sections or distributed, with a strong preference for full distribution employment.   
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Figure 55. Average Loss (Balanced Priority) Partition Tree 
Figure 56 shows the column contributions for the above partition tree. Caliber was 
found to be dominant for Blue lethality in experiment three. When both Blue lethality and 
survivability are considered equally and variability is reduced, caliber is also the 
predominant factor, followed by employment method.  
 
Figure 56. Average Loss (Balanced Priority) Partition Tree Column 
Contributions 
4. Metamodels 
Next, main-effects only models are fit to the mean and variance of Blue casualties 
first, followed by Red casualties. All predictors are included. In these cases, the addition 
of interaction terms are not statistically significant and are not included in the models. With 
only main effects, the direct comparison of the prediction profilers for mean and variance 
90 
will allow us to determine which factors drive expected performance towards the target 
value while also reducing variability. 
a. Blue Casualties 
 A metamodel is constructed by evaluating all main effects against the 
responses of Blue casualty mean and variance. Figure 57 shows the resulting prediction 
profiler after the model is constructed. Blue casualty variability plots are shown within the 
magenta outlines and mean Blue casualty plots are outlined in yellow.  
 
Figure 57. Blue Casualty (Blue Survivability) Robust Metamodel Prediction 
Profiler 
A neutral slope means that the factor has negligible effect on the response. Any 
positive or negative slope indicates that the factor does affect the response, with the 
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magnitude of the slope indicating the significance of the factor. In this case, employment 
method has a series of steep negative slopes and influences both variability and mean Blue 
casualties greatly.  
The first goal is to identify the factors important for reducing variability (outlined 
in magenta). A slider is dynamically moved to the category or numerical value which 
imparts lower (or least) variability. Main effects which most impact variability for Blue 
casualties are employment method, time to survivability move, concealment, and max 
range.  
Once variability is reduced, the mean casualty plots are adjusted to minimize Blue 
casualties sustained. In this model, there are no instances in which variability and mean are 
negatively correlated (opposing slope directionality). The sliders for caliber, time to 
displacement after incoming, and displacement time are adjusted intuitively to reduce mean 
Blue casualties. Factors not adjusted were offensive and defensive rate of fire and 
emplacement time. Offensive and defensive rates of fire were not adjusted as these main 
effects are inconsequential to variability and mean Blue casualties. Emplacement time was 
not adjusted as the model suggests that a long emplacement time reduces Blue casualties—
while this may be true for the model itself (a unit is not detectable during emplacement, 
and therefore cannot be killed), it is not practicable for real world implementation.  
Ultimately, a Blue construct that is robust to a wide range of Red constructs and 
sustains low casualties has the following characteristics: 
• Distributed employment  
• 155mm caliber 
• Conducts survivability moves frequently 
• Displaces immediately after receiving incoming fire 
• Maintains high concealment 
• Has a fast displacement time 
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• Has a short maximum range 
It is important to note that this robust configuration is informed only by the Blue 
survivability metric. Some of the above characteristics will differ with respect to robust 
analysis on Blue lethality, presented next.  
b. Red Casualties 
The same metamodel construction process as above is repeated for Red casualty 
mean and variance. Figure 58 shows the resulting prediction profiler after the model is 
constructed.  
 
Figure 58. Red Casualty (Blue Lethality) Robust Metamodel Prediction 
Profiler 
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As Red casualties are a measure of Blue lethality, the mean Red casualty target is 
maximized after reducing variance. Many factors do not influence variability. Caliber is 
the most influential factor to variability, followed by employment method. The remainder 
of the factors are negligible to variability. After minimizing variance, Red casualties are 
increased with the prediction profiler sliders.  
A Blue construct that is robust to a wide range of Red constructs and produces high 
Red casualties has the following characteristics: 
• Distributed employment  
• 155mm caliber 
• Conducts survivability moves infrequently 
• Remains in position after incoming, returning effective defensive 
counterfire 
• Maintains high concealment 
• Has a fast displacement time 
• Has a long maximum range 
Employment method, caliber, concealment, and displacement time extremes agree 
with the findings in the Blue casualty robust configuration. Similarly, Blue offensive and 
defensive rates of fire and emplacement time are not significant to either variance or mean 
Red casualties. However, three factors conflict with the findings from the Blue casualty 
model. In the Red casualty model, time to survivability move, displacement after incoming, 
and maximum range are maximized. In the Blue casualty model, these factors were 
minimized. It is for these factors specifically that a balance is required.  
c. Opposing Factor Finding Reconciliation 
Considering both Blue lethality and survivability robust models, a higher maximum 
range contributed to slightly more variance in both cases. However, a contradiction exists 
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when minimizing Blue casualties and maximizing Red casualties. By minimizing range, 
Blue casualties are lowered. By maximizing range, Red casualties are raised. To compare 
the relative responses with respect to range, a model of all main effects was created with 
Blue and Red mean casualties as the responses. After applying consensus conclusions 
found above, the Blue max range prediction profiler was compared, seen in Figure 59.  
 
Figure 59. Maximum Range Prediction Profiler for Blue and Red Casualties 
The absolute value of the magnitude of the slopes indicates that while extending 
maximum range is slightly detrimental to sustaining more Blue casualties, it is more 
beneficial to inflicting a higher quantity of Red casualties. Therefore, a higher maximum 
range is slightly more beneficial to Blue. Due to the modeling logic, a low maximum range 
would cause units to continue to bound forward by executing survivability moves, whereas 
a high maximum range would allow the unit to execute both offensive and defensive fires. 
The translation from the modeling environment to a real-world counterbattery engagement 
would be that it is beneficial for Blue to possess longer range capability but initially 
prioritize closing distance as quickly as possible.  
The two other conflicting factors of time until survivability move and displacement 
after incoming are most effectively analyzed by tracing the capability TPP decision tree 
previously presented in Figure 51 (presented redundantly below as Figure 60) from the 
bottom branch terminations up to the start node and setting them dynamically in the 
prediction profiler. All findings were in keeping with the decision tree. Rather than 
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suggesting a prescriptive time until survivability move and displacement after incoming 
time, the analyst suggests that these TTP based factors are best determined by utilizing the 
decision tree, beginning with capabilities.  
 
Figure 60. TTP Decision Tree (repeated from Figure 51) 
5. Experiment Four Insights 
The factors which contribute the most to variability are employment method, time 
to survivability move, concealment, max range, and caliber. Variability is reduced 
predominantly by distributing forces and employing 155mm weapon systems. After 
variability is reduced, the target goals of minimizing Blue casualties and maximizing Red 
casualties presents sets of both concurrent and conflicting force design and employment 
decisions.  
A Blue force which prioritizes survivability is best suited to be fast and nimble, 
characterized by frequent survivability moves, quick displacement times, and immediate 
displacement after receiving incoming fires.  
96 
A Blue force which prioritizes lethality is most effective when it conducts 
survivability moves infrequently and elects to remain in position after receiving incoming 
fires, returning effective defensive counterfire.  
An effective artillery force must balance these priorities. After comparative robust 
analysis, the tactics employed by the artillery force is determined to be dependent on their 
capabilities. These decisions are best informed by the decision tree presented in Figures 51 
and 60. This tree was derived from experiment three and reinforced by findings in 
experiment four. Additionally, the employed weapon system should have maximum range 
capability of at least 17,000 meters.  
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RED FORCE DESIGN: HYBRID VERSUS CANNON-
PURE 
The methodology for robust analysis presented above was repeated from the Red 
perspective, treating Red factors as controllable and Blue factors as uncontrollable. A linear 
regression model was constructed for Blue casualties, or Red lethality. The most influential 
factor for Red lethality was the employment of a hybrid force (two cannon batteries and 
one MLRS battery) versus a cannon pure force (three cannon batteries and no MLRS 
batteries). Red is observed to be more lethal when employing a cannon-pure construct. This 
can be seen in the sorted parameter estimates for Red lethality from the Red perspective in 
Figure 61.  
 
Figure 61. Factor Significance for Red Lethality (Blue Casualties) 
Evaluating across all Red and Blue factor levels and controlling for Red force 
design, Red produces a mean of 11 Blue casualties when employed in a cannon pure force 
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design and a mean of six Blue casualties when employed as a hybrid, cannon-MLRS mix. 
Variability in Blue casualties is largest in the hybrid case, seen in Figure 62.  
 
Figure 62. Blue Casualties by Red Force Design (Hybrid versus Cannon Pure) 
With the knowledge that the Red force design is significant in terms of Red 
lethality, Blue tactics are analyzed in two cases: Red hybrid force design and Red cannon 
pure force design.  
From the insights from all experiments, the author designates six theoretical Blue 
cannon constructs. The base case used a Blue force approximating current USMC 
capabilities, derived from training and readiness standards and current equipment 
capabilities. Experiment two retained all parameters of the best-approximation force but 
changed employment method. The first four theoretical constructs represent the best-
approximation of the current USMC artillery force across the four distinct employment 
options (all factor levels other than employment method are held constant). 
Experiment four insights lead to robust Blue cannon constructs. Two opposing 
tactics emerged, which were:  
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• Nimble: Characterized by frequent survivability moves, quick 
displacement times, and immediate displacement after receiving incoming 
fires 
• Staying: Characterized by infrequent survivability moves and remaining 
in position after receiving incoming fires, returning effective defensive 
counterfire.  
As a result of three-way factor interactions, these two tactics are changed in the 
time to survivability move and time to displace after incoming factors.  
Figure 63 shows these six theoretical Blue cannon constructs and their associated 
factor levels.  
 
Figure 63. Theoretical Blue Cannon Construct Factor Levels 
After controlling for Red force design (cannon-pure and hybrid), the parameters for 
each factor were input in the prediction profiler. Mean Red and Blue casualties and 95% 
confidence intervals were attained and are presented in Figure 64.  
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Figure 64. Theoretical Blue Cannon Construct Mean Performance with 95% 
Confidence Intervals 
Under current construct capabilities (1-4), performance progressively increases for 
Blue as employment method becomes more segmented, supporting the findings in 
experiments two through four. For proposed future constructs, the robust nimble construct 
(5) has the best Blue survivability performance, and the robust staying construct (6) 
exhibits the best results for Blue lethality.  
Figure 65 visualizes the relative performance of the six theoretical Blue artillery 
constructs in both cannon-pure and hybrid Red force design scenarios. Mean Red and Blue 
casualty points are designated by the cross-point, with 95% confidence intervals for 
casualties sustained by Red (vertical) and Blue (horizontal) constituting the dimensions of 
the surrounding box.  
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Figure 65. Comparison of Theoretical Blue Cannon Constructs by Red Force 
Design 
The specific location and size of variation is a function of the range of factor levels 
over which Red and Blue were varied in this study. As each factor range was constructed 
widely to encompass capability extremes, the mean performance cannot be interpreted to 
be predictive. Therefore, relative location and size of variation is more significant than 
specific location and size of variation for drawing insight.  
Observing the cluster of Blue constructs as a whole and comparing location 
between the two Red force designs, it is apparent that when Red uses a hybrid force with 
one MLRS battery, both Red and Blue are more lethal and produce more casualties (cluster 
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located mid-upper left for Red cannon pure, shifted upper center for Red hybrid). Red is 
able to produce more Blue casualties due to large area mass rocket salvos. Blue is able to 
produce more Red casualties due to the unarmored characteristics of the MLRS.  
The dimensions and area of the variation boxes is larger in the Red hybrid force 
design case. This is likely the result of the simulation time in which the MLRS battery was 
destroyed by Blue. If destroyed early, the MLRS battery is unable to conduct mass rocket 
fires. Conversely, if the MLRS battery is not destroyed early in the simulation, mass fires 
are able to swing tactical tempo favorable to Red.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarizes findings from experiments one through four, draws 
conclusions about factor significance for cannon artillery lethality and survivability, and 
presents recommendations for immediate consideration. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on future work to further this study in the analytic, wargaming, and 
experimentation communities of interest.  
A. SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENT FINDINGS 
Experiment One: Fight Tonight served as the base case and imagines a 
counterbattery fight occurring between USMC and Russian forces as currently equipped 
and employed. The findings are that the current USMC construct is not postured for success 
in a counterbattery engagement with Russian forces.  
Experiment Two: Train Tomorrow evaluated the efficacy of altering the most 
rapidly affectable factor of employment method. As Blue artillery units became more 
segmented and dispersed, Blue inflicts more Red casualties and sustains fewer Blue 
casualties, showing that dispersion increases Blue lethality and survivability. Each level of 
additional dispersion results in both a faster time to kill at least 50 percent of the Red 
artillery force and more observations in which Blue achieves this goal, leading to the 
conclusion that dispersion increases tempo significantly. Although logistics is outside of 
the scope of this study, total projectile expenditure was analyzed and found to be within 
feasible bounds for all employment methods considered.  
Experiment Three: Optimize the Force considered all controllable Blue factors to 
determine which are most important to USMC lethality and survivability. Caliber is the 
dominant factor for lethality, and a 155mm weapon system was found to be critical for 
inflicting the maximum amount of Red casualties. While there is no single dominating 
factor for Blue survivability, employment method and caliber are the most influential 
factors for minimizing Blue casualties. Unique three-way interactions emerged, leading to 
a capability based TTP decision tree. The ultimate conclusions from experiment three are 
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that it is critical that a USMC artillery battalion employ 155mm weapon systems, disperse 
as much as possible, and employ tactics based on the operational capabilities of the unit.  
Experiment Four: Hedge the Construct considered controllable Blue factors and 
uncontrollable Red factors to determine the most significant factors for USMC 
performance over a range of unknown or future Russian capabilities and tactics. The 
methodology used in experiment four enabled the analysis of robust Blue constructs that 
consistently perform well while remaining resilient across a wide range of Red constructs. 
Keeping with the findings of experiments one and two, caliber and employment method 
remain critically important. Maximum range was determined to be the third most important 
factor for lethality and a threshold of greater than 17,000 meters was established. The 
remainder of the factors are meaningful in their interactions with each-other and ideal 
levels are determined by unit capabilities and the priorities of the commander. A Blue force 
that prioritizes survivability should be nimble, displacing and emplacing quickly, and 
changing positions frequently; whereas a Blue force that prioritizes lethality should have a 
staying mentality, remaining in position returning defensive fire if fired upon and changing 
positions infrequently. These TTP decisions are mutually exclusive, and the author 
assumes that the commander desires to balance these priorities. The TTP decision tree 
derived in experiment three was validated in experiment four and was determined to be 
appropriate in determining TTPs predicated on the operational capabilities of the employed 
unit.  
The most influential factor for Red lethality was found to be the inclusion of an 
MLRS battery in a hybrid force design. When controlling for this factor, it was found that 
when Red includes an MLRS battery, the number of casualties for both Red and Blue 
increases.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of this study are that the equipment currently fielded by USMC 
artillery battalions is largely in line with the most significant factors for lethality and 
survivability. However, significant changes to current TTPs are necessary for force 
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protection and mission success. The author presents four recommendations for immediate 
consideration within the artillery community of interest.  
1. Caliber and Range 
• Finding: M777A2 currently meets all equipment-based significant factor 
thresholds for success in a counterbattery scenario. 
• Discussion: The M777A2 is a 155mm caliber weapon system and 
possesses a maximum range above the 17,000-meter threshold. This study 
finds that the current USMC artillery equipment set, specifically the 
M777A2, is sufficient in significant factor equipment capabilities of 
caliber and range. 
• Recommendation: Funding for artillery research and development is not 
critical for cannon artillery at this time and should remain allocated for 
rocket modernization. 
2. Employment Method 
• Finding: Employment method is a critical factor for Blue survivability and 
lethality with increased dispersion and segmentation of units important for 
improved performance in both metrics. 
• Discussion: Current USMC artillery battalion TTPs are diametrically 
opposed to the findings of this study, principally in employment method. 
USMC artillery batteries are currently conventionally employed as 
consolidated, battery sized units. While operating in a consolidated 
method reduces C2 complexities and increases local security defensive 
posturing, the risk to mission and risk to force is greatly elevated in a 
counterbattery scenario against a formidable opponent such as Russia.  
• Recommendation: USMC artillery battalions immediately begin training 
employment methods that maximize segmentation of firing units. 
Command and control at the battalion and battery level, local security 
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resilience, and operational endurance of individual firing elements should 
be field tested and improved accordingly. This effort should be informed 
by, and inform, rocket artillery employment in the context of EABO.  
3. Tactics 
• Finding: Interactions between remaining factors present unique TTP force 
design decisions. 
• Discussion: Defensive rate of fire, emplacement time, time to survivability 
move, and time in position after receiving incoming are not dominantly 
significant but are meaningful in relation to each other. Simply, the two 
broad tactics are nimble or staying. Neither tactic has significant benefits 
to absolute performance over the other, but unit attributes should be 
consistent with the overall spirit of tactics employed. While a nimble force 
is attractive for survivability, the fast emplacement and displacement times 
and frequent survivability moves present a risk to force endurance. 
Ultimately, the tactics employed will be a function of commander 
priorities, unit capabilities, and situation. It is recommended that the 
commander’s decisions be informed by unit capabilities, referencing the 
TTP decision tree. 
• Recommendation: Units assess their current capabilities to determine the 
most effective tactics by referencing the TTP decision tree. 
4. Russian Artillery Force Composition 
• Finding: A Russian artillery force that includes an MLRS battery increases 
the casualties sustained by both sides compared to a cannon-pure Russian 
artillery force.  
• Discussion: The Russian military is an artillery-centric force and 
prioritizes mass artillery fires. The modular and composite design of the 
BTG allows Russia to field either a cannon-pure or hybrid MLRS force, 
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depending on tactical objectives. Inclusion of an MLRS battery in the 
BTG brings the capability of mass area rocket salvo fires. The critical 
vulnerability of the Russian MLRS is its lack of armor protection. If a 
hybrid force with MLRS is fielded for a counterbattery engagement, both 
Blue and Red sustain more casualties.  
• Recommendation: MLRS should be designated as a high-value target and 
prioritized for targeting. Early destruction of the soft-skin, unarmored 
(easily destructible) MLRS removes the threat of large area mass salvos 
(highly lethal).  
C. FUTURE WORK 
Both logistics and command and control were outside the scope of this study. 
Having determined that the current shortfalls in cannon artillery are held largely at the 
employment method level, the author presents two recommendations for future work.  
1. Logistics 
Logistics in support of artillery battalion operations were outside the scope of this 
thesis and research objectives. Although battalion ammunition expenditure was analyzed 
at the surface level to ensure feasibility, the logistics complexities associated with a 
distributed force was not analyzed. Further research is recommended for each level of 
possible employment method to determine supporting demands for distribution of supplies 
and medical support.  
2. Command and Control Complexity 
This study assumed perfect communications between all communication chains. 
Although dispersion was found to increase lethality and survivability, it naturally results in 
a more complex C2 structure. The potential increase in radio traffic has potential to create 
a negative effect to concealment, rendering transmitting units vulnerable to electronic 
detection, targeting, and destruction. Further research is recommended to determine the 
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appropriate C2 network for each employment method with particular focus on existing 
Digital Fire Control System capabilities.  
D. THE MODELING & SIMULATION, WARGAMING, AND 
EXPERIMENTATION PARADIGM 
The process of fielding new capabilities or redesigning a force is expensive in time 
and resources. An analytical paradigm between modeling and simulation, wargaming, and 
experimentation exists to reduce these costs and leverage the relative strengths of each.  
Modeling and simulation attempt to approximate reality within scope and is thus 
only as powerful as the quality of quantitative data from experimentation and qualitative 
outcomes from wargaming. Experimentation produces real-world conclusions for 
feasibility and live fire data, but requires significant manpower and resources. Simulation 
reduces these costs through relatively inexpensive computer replication and statistical 
analysis. Wargaming aims to capture human decisions to ensure that appropriate and useful 
experiments are conducted.  
A white paper on modeling and simulation, experimentation, and wargaming from 
the MITRE corporation concludes that “each of [modeling and simulation], 
experimentation and wargaming exist on a spectrum ranging from very basic applications 
to the highly complex. In many ways, these techniques are fundamentally intertwined and 
there are meaningful opportunities for reuse and cross-domain solutions within this space 
(Page 2016, p. 9). In The Art of Wargaming, author Peter Perla visualizes this three-way 
symbiotic relationship, adapted in Figure 66.  
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Figure 66. Modeling & Simulation, Wargaming, and Experimentation 
Paradigm. Adapted from The Art of Wargaming (Perla 2012) 
The outputs and conclusions of each element in the design triad serve to inform 
concurrent and future iterations of the others. In the case of this thesis, conclusions are 
intended to inform both experimentation and wargaming. A method for broad analysis 
campaigns involving diverse analysis techniques such as simulations, wargames, and live 
exercises can be found in Lucas et al. 1997. The author recommends the following actions 
be taken to further this research: 
• Operational cannon artillery units conduct internal wargaming to 
determine C2 architecture, logistics networks, and equipment 
requirements to support distributed operations. Operational cannon 
artillery units test distributed battalion artillery operations in a realistic 
training environment to assess feasibility, human factors, and weaknesses.  
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• The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) sponsor wargames at the 
operational level to determine the capability gaps associated with the 
reduction of cannon artillery, current cannon artillery constructs, and 
robust cannon constructs presented in this study. It is recommended that if 
the cannon artillery mission is to be assumed by another service (US 
Army), gaining responsibility service representation participate in 
wargaming. 
• Outputs and conclusions from all above be routed appropriately for 
consideration for implementation in a higher-level modeling and 
simulation environment and scenario.  
The underlying intent of this thesis is to provide data-driven bottom-up refinement 
during USMC force redesign efforts. Questions surrounding cannon artillery lethality and 
survivability in a peer fight began to emerge at the battalion level during the author’s 
operational time at Battery B, 1st Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment. The author is hopeful 
that the findings in this study answer these questions and provide useful inputs for future 
cannon artillery modernization within the modeling and simulation, wargaming, and 







APPENDIX A. UAS SENSOR CAPABILITY 
Both Red and Blue use one UAS modeled after the USMC RQ-21A Blackjack. 
While data on sensor performance is limited at the unclassified level, the researcher used a 
2015 Operational Test and Evaluation report to estimate sensor performance. In initial 
testing, the RQ-21A was employed at a search height of 3000ft above ground level (AGL) 
and a sensor tilt angle of 45 degrees with the task of correctly classifying one-meter and 
three-meter objects (DOT&E 2015). At this flight altitude and sensor tilt, a target 
acquisition range of 4242 feet is achieved. A summary of successful classification 
percentages is shown in Figure 67.  
 
Figure 67. Percent Correct Classification at Slant Range 4,242 Feet (with 80% 
Confidence Intervals). Source: DOT&E (2015). 
This thesis assumes that the UAS will be employing the electro-optical sensor. As 
MANA assumes a foundational terrain of flat ground, the desert environment is used to 
extrapolate approximate sensor performance. Additionally, MANA assumes all agents are 
at ground level, and UAS movement is established as setting the agent to be unaffected by 
terrain. Therefore, assuming that the UAS is at 0ft AGL, a 45 deg sensor tilt at 4242ft AGL 
would be equivalent to 914.4m (3000ft) horizontally, and 914.4m is used as the range for 
41% correct classification. A 100% correct classification probability is assumed when the 
UAS is directly overhead, or at range zero meters.  
Assuming a linear relationship, the two data points of 100% correct classification 
at zero meters and 41% correct classification at 914.4 meters are used to fit a line for 
probability of correct classification by range, shown in Figure 68.  
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Figure 68. RQ-21A Blackjack Probability of Classification by Range 
The study suggests that a 3-meter object has 100% correct classification under the 
experiment parameters (DOT&E 2015). This thesis assumes that all artillery targets are 
approximately 3-meter targets. Assuming that the probability of correct classification of 3-
meter objects is 100% up to the tested range of 914.4 meters, the estimated regression line 
is appended and the resulting estimate for probability of correct classification is shown in 
Figure 69.  
 
Figure 69. RQ-21A Blackjack Probability of Classification Distribution 
Figure 70 displays the sensor parameters for the UAS agent in MANA. The sensor 
has a maximum range of 2500. Time between detection is stochastic, and the UAS has a 
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mean time between detection of 30 seconds. In the ‘Classify’ parameter section, probability 
of correct classification is set according to the probability distribution derived above.  
 
Figure 70. Modeled UAS Sensor Parameters 
Red and Blue UAS are capable of detecting Agent Classes 3 and 4. Agent Class 3 
corresponds to artillery units which are emplaced and unmasked as well as artillery units 
which are displacing. Agent Class 4 corresponds to artillery units which are emplaced and 
unmasked (recently firing or being fired at). The only states in which a UAS cannot detect 
an artillery unit is when it is moving or emplacing.  
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APPENDIX B. BASE CASE CONVENTIONAL FORCES 
Figure 71 provides a brief comparative summary of Russian and USMC equipment 
capabilities.  
 
Adapted from Janes (2021A), (2021B), DOT&E (2015), Defense Innovation Sweden (2019), United 
States Marine Corps (2013), Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (2018A). 
Figure 71. Summary of Russian and USMC Conventional Equipment 
Modeled in Experiment One and Two.  
1. Conventional Russian Equipment 
Red is modeled as fires elements of a Russian BTG. Fires elements consist of two 
2S19M2 152mm self-propelled artillery batteries and one 122mm BM21 ‘Grad’ MLRS 
battery. Each firing battery has one organic FDC. Target acquisition platforms include one 
1L219M Zoopark-1M counterbattery radar and one Orlan-10 UAS.  
The Orlan-10 UAS is a Russian artillery regimental asset, capable of 16 hours of 
flight time, a range of 120 km, a maximum altitude of 5 km, and a cruising speed of 90–
116 
150 km/h. After testing compatibility between three self-propelled howitzers batteries and 
one Orlan-10 in 2016, the Orlan-10 was adopted as the UAS of preference for Russian 
artillery operations (Janes 2020c). 
 
Figure 72. Orlan-10 UAS. Source: Ministry of Defence of the Russian 
Federation (2018A). 
The 1L219M Zoopark-1M counterbattery radar can detect multiple simultaneous 
artillery points of origin to a range of 23 km. Once a projectile is detected, its trajectory is 
computed and point of origin is identified. The Zoopark crew transmits the point of origin 
location to firing units to initiate a counterfire mission. The Zoopark can cover a sector of 
90 degrees and is capable of scanning between sectors rapidly. The Zoopark is controlled 
by a crew of three and can be operated continuously for eight hours (Jane’s 2020d). 
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Figure 73. Zoopark-1m, 1L219M Counterbattery Radar. Source: Ministry of 
Defence of the Russian Federation (2018b). 
The 2S19M2 152mm self-propelled howitzer has a maximum range of 24.7 km 
when firing conventional OF-45-HE-FRAG high explosive rounds. Maximum rate of fire 
is ten rounds per minute and a sustained rate of fire of four rounds per minute. 
Emplacement time of a 2S19M2 is noted as 30 seconds. The hull of the vehicle is based on 
the Russian T-72 tank and is outfitted with armor. While exact specifications on armor 
thickness are not available from unclassified intelligence sources, it is understood that the 
armor is primarily used as protection from artillery fragmentation as the primary 
anticipated threat for the 2S19M2 is artillery counterfire (Jane’s 2021a). 
 
Figure 74. 2S19M2 Self-Propelled Howitzer. Source: Janes (2021a) 
118 
The 122mm BM21 ‘Grad’ MLRS has a maximum range of 20,750m when firing 
the standard 9M22 rocket. As the BM21 is typically employed as a mass area fire weapon 
system, its entire rocket pod is expended in a single fire mission, with a salvo firing time 
of 36 rockets in 18 seconds. The BM21 can emplace in 2.5 minutes and displace in 30 
seconds. A crew of five can reload the BM21 in eight minutes. The BM21 is unarmored 
(Jane’s 2021b). 
 
Figure 75. BM-21 ‘Grad’ MLRS. Source: Janes (2021b). 
2. Conventional USMC Equipment 
Blue is modeled as a USMC M777A2 155mm cannon battalion. Each firing battery 
has one organic FDC. Target acquisition platforms include one AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR 
counterbattery radar and one RQ-21 Blackjack UAS.  
The RQ-21A Blackjack UAS is of 16 hours of flight time, a range of 92 km, a 
maximum altitude of 5.79 km, and a cruising speed of 111 km/h (Jane’s 2020e). It is 
equipped with an electro-optical and infrared sensor for target detection (DOT&E 2015). 
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Figure 76. RQ-21A Blackjack UAS. Source: DOT&E (2015). 
The AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR counterbattery radar can detect multiple simultaneous 
cannon points of origin to a range of 40 km and rocket points of origin to a range of 50 km. 
The G/ATOR can cover a sector of 90 degrees and is capable of scanning between sectors 
rapidly. The G/ATOR is controlled by a crew of four (Jane’s 2021c). 
 
Figure 77. AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR Counterbattery Radar. Source: Defense 
Innovation Sweden (2019) 
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The M777A2 155mm towed howitzer has a maximum range of 24.7 km when firing 
conventional high explosive rounds. Maximum published rate of fire is four rounds per 
minute and a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute. By current USMC Training 
and Readiness Standards, emplacement time is six minutes and displacement time is three 
minutes (USMC 2018). The M777A2 is towed by the MTVR and is unarmored.  
 
Figure 78. M777A2, Towed by MTVR. Source: MCIPAC, USMC (2013). 
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